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SEC REGULATORY ANALYSIS:
“A LONG WAY TO GO AND
A SHORT TIME TO GET THERE” 1
Jerry Ellig * & Hester Peirce **
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or
Commission) regulates the U.S. securities markets. Its rules affect the
participants in those markets, including retail investors and public
companies. SEC rules are supposed to help protect investors, facilitate
capital formation, and foster fair, orderly, and efficient markets. The SEC
writes disclosure rules for public companies and oversees the activities of
over 20,000 financial firms, including investment advisers, mutual funds
and other exchange-traded funds, broker-dealers, national securities
exchanges, credit-rating agencies, and a number of financial market utilities
and quasi-governmental regulators.
Given that SEC rules can have sweeping effects on the U.S. economy,
the role of economic analysis in shaping those rules is crucial. Without an
evidence-based assessment of the problem the Commission seeks to solve
and the pros and cons of alternative solutions, the Commission would be
flying blind. Recognizing this reality, Congress included in the SEC’s
authorizing legislation a requirement that the Commission conduct
economic analysis when it determines whether new rules are in the public
interest. Federal appeals courts have vacated several SEC rules due to
inadequate economic analysis. The SEC, pledging to do better, published
staff economic analysis guidance in March 2012 that covers many of the
same topics executive branch agencies are expected to address in
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of major regulations.
Considering the controversy generated by recent court cases, an
evaluation of economic analysis in SEC regulations is highly timely. This
Article critically examines the quality and use of economic analysis in
seven major final rules promulgated by the SEC prior to the issuance of its
March 2012 staff economic analysis guidance, as well as one major rule
issued after the new guidance. We apply the Mercatus Center’s Regulatory
1. JERRY REED, EAST BOUND AND DOWN (RCA Records 1977).
* Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Ph.D., Economics,

George Mason University, 1988; M.A., Economics, George Mason University, 1986; A.B.,
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Robert Greene; the comments of the anonymous reviewers; the editing work of Ted Bolema; and
the helpful guidance of Richard Williams.
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Report Card, a standardized scoring system employed in published research
on executive agency rulemaking, to assess the regulatory analysis
conducted in connection with these SEC rulemakings. The scoring system
allows us to compare the quality and use of economic analysis at the SEC
with the standards that guide executive branch agencies and with executive
branch agencies’ actual performance.
Important as the SEC is, our study holds implications beyond SEC
rulemaking. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank) granted significant new responsibilities and regulatory
authority to numerous financial regulators, including the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC), the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the newly created Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (the CFPB). Dodd-Frank charged these regulators with
writing new rules governing, among other things, the over-the-counter
derivatives markets, mortgage origination, and the interconnected activities
of large financial institutions. Sound regulation of financial markets and
market participants based on accurate information and rigorous analysis can
help to prevent a future financial crisis. The Government Accountability
Office recently identified inadequacies in economic analysis conducted by
multiple financial regulatory agencies.2 An examination of the role of
economic analysis in SEC rulemaking could reveal best practices from
which other agencies could learn or highlight significant pitfalls they should
avoid in economic analyses of their own rules. In addition, looking at how
the SEC has interpreted its statutory rulemaking obligations can provide
insights for Congress as it considers various regulatory reform bills
designed to foster the use of economic analysis in agency decision-making.
Our principal findings suggest that the SEC’s decision to adopt new
economic analysis guidance was a necessary and appropriate response to
the significant flaws in its previous economic analysis:
• The economic analysis accompanying most of these regulations
was seriously incomplete and rarely used. The SEC regulation we
examined that scored the highest on the Mercatus Regulatory Report Card
earned just 20 out of 60 possible points, or 33%. The highest score for use
of analysis was just 5 out of 20 possible points, or 25%.
• The SEC regulations we examined scored well below executive
branch regulations proposed in 2010–11. Executive branch regulations
earned an average of 29.7 out of 60 possible points (50%), suggesting that
many Regulatory Impact Analyses from executive branch agencies are
seriously incomplete. But the SEC regulations averaged just half this
score—15.7 out of 60 possible points (26%). Similar results occur when we
2. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-13-101, DODD-FRANK ACT: AGENCIES’
EFFORTS TO ANALYZE AND COORDINATE THEIR RULES 2 (2012), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650947.pdf.
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compare the analysis for SEC regulations with the analysis for financial
regulations issued by executive branch agencies.
• The SEC regulations scored much more poorly than executive
branch regulations on the Report Card criteria most directly relevant
to the topics in the SEC’s March 2012 economic analysis guidance. On
average, executive branch agencies earned more than twice the score of the
SEC regulations on the criteria the SEC has identified as crucial for a good
economic analysis.
• The pre-2012 SEC analyses often failed to seriously assess the
problem the regulation was supposed to solve. For example, the SEC
promulgated a rule requiring certain broker-dealers to establish risk
management controls based on an intuited—rather than evidence-based—
fear that broker-dealers might not be employing proper risk controls. In
addition, the SEC required public companies to hold votes related to
executive compensation without looking at whether state law, which has
traditionally governed such matters, was working properly. The SEC also
suggested in that same rulemaking that shareholders were already getting
much of the information that would be required in the rule’s new
disclosures, which begs the question of why the rule is needed.
• The pre-2012 SEC analyses often ignored important
alternatives that should be obvious to an expert agency. The SEC’s
rulemaking to implement its new whistleblowing regime, for example,
could have looked at alternatives based upon some of the many other state
and federal whistleblowing programs. The SEC’s large trader reporting rule
could have assessed the alternative approach of obtaining the needed
information through the consolidated audit trail, a separate rulemaking with
broader, but similar, objectives. Alternatives to new hedge fund reporting
requirements might have included enhanced requirements on private parties
to monitor hedge funds.
• The pre-2012 SEC analyses often ignored significant costs. In
drafting the whistleblower rule, the SEC downplayed the significant
damage that it could do to companies’ internal control systems by
encouraging employees to view the SEC as the first place to go when they
discover a potential problem at their companies. In the rulemakings related
to hedge fund adviser registration and new hedge fund disclosures, the SEC
did not take into account costs to itself and the risks created by decreased
private-sector monitoring in response to a perception of increased
government monitoring of hedge funds.
• The pre-2012 SEC analyses often asserted significant benefits
without providing evidence that the regulation was likely to achieve
them. In the rulemaking instituting the new Form PF, the SEC asserted that
there would be financial stability benefits from all the new information that
the Financial Stability Oversight Council would have at its disposal,
without explaining how that would happen. Similarly, the large trader
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rulemaking simply assumes that the SEC, armed with the new information
required by the rule, will be a better regulator.
• It is too early to tell whether the new economic analysis
guidance is working. We conducted a Report Card evaluation of one
rulemaking that was finalized after the economic analysis guidance was put
into place. The results from that rulemaking show little improvement in the
quality of analysis. This rule achieved about the same total, openness,
analysis, and use scores as the seven pre-2012 SEC rules, but did score
slightly better than the average pre-2012 SEC rule for analysis of the
baseline and alternatives. However, because the SEC has only promulgated
a handful of major rules with the full benefit of the guidance, it is too early
to conclude whether the analysis is improved. The guidance represents an
important milestone for the SEC, and as the agency gains more experience
applying them, there is reason to be optimistic that its analysis will
improve.
We begin in Part I with a discussion of why regulatory analysis matters,
the economic analysis requirements faced by the SEC, and the
Commission’s struggles with those requirements. Part II describes the rules
that we have chosen to analyze. Part III reports the results of the evaluations
of the rules using the Report Card and compares the regulatory analysis
conducted by the SEC, an independent regulatory agency, with the analysis
conducted by executive branch agencies. In Part IV, we suggest how the
SEC could have improved its economic analysis using scholarly literature
and data that should be readily available to the Commission. Part V
analyzes one rule that was adopted after the SEC staff guidance took effect
and considers other indicators of how the SEC’s regulatory analysis has
changed since the guidance’s effective date. We conclude with a discussion
of the implications of getting the analysis wrong and some suggestions for
how the SEC can improve its analysis.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: IT’S NOT JUST A GOOD IDEA; IT’S
THE LAW
The SEC, an independent regulatory agency, is not subject to the same
economic analysis requirements applicable to executive agencies.3 A series
of executive orders has required executive agencies to perform regulatory
analysis as part of their rulemaking process. 4 The Office of Management
3. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012) (listing independent regulatory agencies, including the
SEC); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, § 3(b) (1993–2000), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802–06 (2012) (defining “agency” as any authority of the United States that
is an “agency” under 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1), other than those considered to be independent
regulatory agencies).
4. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 816–17 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3; Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431–34 (1982).
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and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) reviews
these regulatory impact analyses. 5 The question of whether the President
should and could extend the executive orders and OIRA review obligations
to independent regulatory agencies has been debated for some time, but no
President has sought to do so. 6
Although the executive orders have not, to date, been extended to the
SEC, the SEC has statutory analysis requirements. Most important among
these obligations is a requirement that whenever the SEC has to consider
whether a rulemaking is consistent with the public interest, the agency must
“consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” 7 If it is to be more
than a superficial box-checking exercise, consideration of a rulemaking’s
effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation requires an analysis
of the rule’s benefits and costs. As Professors Paul Rose and Christopher
Walker explained, “a failure to provide a reasoned explanation of the
agency’s consideration of efficiency—in other words, its analysis of the
costs and benefits of the proposed regulatory action—would be arbitrary
and capricious under the [Administrative Procedure Act].” 8 Section
23(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) also
requires rulemakings under that act to include a “determination that any
burden on competition imposed by such rule or regulation is necessary or
appropriate.” 9 In addition, a number of discrete statutory provisions require
the SEC to consider economic effects of rules adopted pursuant to those
provisions. 10 In fulfillment of these statutory obligations, the SEC typically
5. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3, § 2(b) (directing OIRA to review executive
agency rulemakings).
6. The former head of OIRA “encouraged” independent agencies “to give consideration to”
President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r,
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, on Executive Order 13,563 (Feb. 2,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m1110.pdf.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2012). This requirement was added to these statutes by
the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, added the language
to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2.
8. PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 27 (2013), available at http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/CBA-Report-3.10.13.pdf; but see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F.
Supp. 2d 43, 56 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining that a mandatory analysis by the SEC of “various
economic-related factors—efficiency, competition, and capital formation” or “some sort of
broader, wide-ranging benefit analysis simply reads too much into this statutory language”).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2).
10. See, e.g., id. § 78f(k)(1) (“To the extent necessary or appropriate in the public interest, to
promote fair competition, and consistent with the promotion of market efficiency, innovation, and
expansion of investment opportunities, the protection of investors, and the maintenance of fair and
orderly markets, the Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall jointly
issue such rules, regulations, or orders as are necessary and appropriate to permit the offer and
sale of a security futures product traded on or subject to the rules of a foreign board of trade to
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includes an analysis section—the so-called “back-end”—in its notices of
proposed and final rulemaking.
The quality and extent of the analysis have been called into question by
academics, oversight bodies, and courts. Fraas and Lutter, in their
examination of three major SEC rules, identified a number of flaws in the
SEC’s approach to economic analysis.11 Aside from Paperwork Reduction
Act estimates, discussions of costs and benefits were largely qualitative. 12
The SEC did not attempt to quantify costs such as “increased transaction
costs or a reduction in market efficiency.” 13 A rule related to short selling
included some analysis of data about the effect of short sale restrictions, but
lacked “a framework of analysis that would pull together the various pieces
of evidence and analysis into a more complete whole.” 14
The SEC’s inspector general undertook an assessment of the SEC’s
cost-benefit analysis practices in connection with certain Dodd-Frank
rulemakings and identified a number of issues with the SEC’s approach. 15
There was no attempt to quantify benefits or costs other than information
collection costs. 16 The focus was on discretionary elements of the
rulemaking and ignored the analysis of the elements of the rulemaking that
were statutorily mandated.17 “[T]he SEC sometimes used multiple baselines
in its cost-benefit analyses that were ambiguous or internally
inconsistent.” 18 In some cases, the SEC did not clearly justify the regulatory
action being undertaken.19 For most rules, the SEC failed to take into
account the SEC’s administrative costs. 20 There was redundancy between
the cost-benefit analysis and efficiency, competition, and capital formation
sections of the releases. 21 The inspector general made six corresponding
United States persons.”); id. § 78o(n)(2) (“In developing any rules under [the prior paragraph
relating to disclosures by broker-dealers to retail investors], the Commission shall consider
whether the rules will promote investor protection, efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.”).
11. See generally Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at
Independent Regulatory Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 213 (2011).
12. Id. at 232–33.
13. Id. at 233.
14. Id. at 234.
15. SEC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NO. 499, FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSES IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS vi–vii (2012) [hereinafter SEC
2012 IG REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2012/rpt499
_followupreviewofd-f_costbenefitanalyses_508.pdf. This report was a follow-up to an earlier, less
in-depth report on the same subject. See SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF REVIEW OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN
CONNECTION WITH DODD-FRANK ACT RULEMAKINGS (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov
/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2011/report_6_13_11.pdf.
16. SEC 2012 IG REPORT, supra note 15, at vi.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at vii.
20. See id.
21. Id. at vi.
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recommendations and urged the SEC to deepen economists’ involvement in
the process. 22
The Government Accountability Office also reported on rulemaking by
the federal financial regulators, including the SEC, and concluded the
following:
While the regulators identified the problem to be addressed in their rule
proposals, CFTC, the Federal Reserve, and SEC did not present benefitcost information in ways consistent with certain key elements of OMB’s
Circular A-4 [which guides executive agencies in their performance of
RIAs]. For example, CFTC and SEC did not evaluate the benefits and
costs of regulatory alternatives they considered for key provisions
compared to their chosen approach . . . .
SEC did not quantitatively analyze the benefits . . . . CFTC and SEC
monetized and quantified paperwork-related costs under PRA, but did not
23
quantify any other costs.

Courts have also weighed in. Over the past seven years, the SEC has
lost several important court cases based on how it has carried out its
analysis obligations. 24 The first of these cases, Chamber of Commerce v.
SEC, arose from a rulemaking that would have effectively required mutual
funds to have a super-majority of independent directors and an independent
chairman. 25 The court held that the SEC had “violate[d] the APA by failing
adequately to consider the costs mutual funds would incur . . . and by
failing adequately to consider a proposed alternative to the independent
chairman condition.”26 The court expressly refused to hold that the SEC
was required to conduct an empirical study of its own, or that it could not
reject a study submitted to it based on legitimate concerns about the study,
but faulted the SEC for not doing what it could to understand the costs of
the rule. 27 The court explained that
uncertainty may limit what the Commission can do, but it does not excuse
the Commission from its statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise
itself—and hence the public and the Congress—of the economic
consequences of a proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt
28
the measure.

22. Id. at vii–viii.
23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 16, 18. It should be noted that the

GAO reviewed only one major SEC rule in depth. Id. at 4.
24. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity Inv.
Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443
F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
25. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 137.
26. Id. at 136.
27. Id. at 142–44.
28. Id. at 144.
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The court also held that the SEC was required to consider a reasonable
alternative raised by the dissenting commissioners and commenters.29
On remand, the SEC upheld the rule after about a week of deliberation
without reopening the comment period.30 The SEC responded to the court’s
determination that it had not adequately assessed the costs of its rulemaking
by undertaking a new assessment using “the existing record, together with
publicly available information.”31 The SEC’s action was again challenged,
and the court found that the SEC’s reliance on extra-record data was
inappropriate because the public had not had a chance to comment on it.32
One component of a good RIA is notifying the public of the data upon
which the agency relies so that members of the public can respond.33
Moreover, the court found that, despite admitted gaps in cost data, the SEC
had not considered actual cost data from funds that were already complying
with the new requirements in anticipation of the rulemaking compliance
date. 34
The SEC’s approach to assessing the effects on competition, efficiency,
and capital formation was central to the court’s holding in American Equity
Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC. 35 The rule at issue in American
Equity deemed fixed index annuities to be governed by the securities laws
rather than solely by state insurance laws—which meant that the SEC
would regulate these annuities. 36 The court held that the SEC’s analysis of
each of the three elements under section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933
(the Securities Act) 37—competition, efficiency, and capital formation—was
arbitrary and capricious. 38 The SEC had concluded that the rule would
29. Id. at 145 (“[T]he disclosure alternative was neither frivolous nor out of bounds and the
Commission therefore had an obligation to consider it.”) (citing the standard set forth in Laclede
Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 873 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
30. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,985, 70 Fed.
Reg. 39,390, 39,390 (July 7, 2005).
31. Id. at 39,391.
32. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
33. See, e.g., Circular A-4 from Office of Mgmt. and Budget to the Heads of Exec. Agencies
& Establishments 17 (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Circular A-4], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf (setting
forth guidelines for transparency and reproducibility of RIAs and their underlying assumptions,
methods, and data).
34. Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d at 906.
35. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
36. Id. at 928 (“By redefining an ‘annuity contract’ to exclude [fixed index annuities], the
Commission sought to ensure that purchasers of FIAs would be entitled to the full protection of
the federal securities laws.”); see also Baird Webel & Rena S. Miller, Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 151A and Annuities: Issues and Legislation 5 (Cong. Res. Serv. July 1, 2010),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA530625 (“The primary impact of
this rule change is that many, if not most, of the practices related to the sale of indexed annuities
of those companies and individuals selling indexed annuities will be regulated by both the SEC
and the states.”).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012).
38. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 572 F.3d at 934.

2014]

SEC Regulatory Analysis

369

increase competition, but the basis it cited in reaching that conclusion was
that the rulemaking would decrease uncertainty, a rationale that, the court
pointed out, could have applied to any rulemaking, not just the particular
rule at issue. 39 The court also cited the SEC’s failure to assess the existing
level of competition under the state regulatory framework. 40 The SEC’s
efficiency analysis failed “to analyze the efficiency of the existing state law
regime.” 41 The capital formation analysis relied on the efficiency analysis,
so it too was arbitrary and capricious.42
Business Roundtable v. SEC was a challenge to the SEC’s first
rulemaking under Dodd-Frank. 43 The rule at issue would have required
public companies to include at company expense in their proxy materials
information about shareholder-nominated candidates for company boards of
directors. The court held that “the Commission was arbitrary and capricious
in promulgating” the rule and vacated it.44 The court’s holding was based
on the SEC’s “failure to ‘apprise itself—and hence the public and the
Congress—of the economic consequences of’” the rule as required by the
SEC’s organic statute. 45
In determining that the SEC’s assessment of the economic effects of the
rule was flawed, the court pointed to a number of problems. First, the SEC
did not attempt to estimate the costs that companies would incur as a result
of the rule, even though there was available evidence concerning costs. 46
Second, the SEC did not have sufficient empirical support for its prediction
that the rule would enhance board performance and shareholder value.47
Third, the SEC discounted the rule’s costs by attributing them to the state
law granting shareholders the right to elect directors, not the rule’s
requirement that companies pay for shareholder nominees to be included in
the company’s proxy materials. 48 Fourth, the rule did not take adequate
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 934–35.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 936.
See id.
The rule at issue was proposed prior to Dodd-Frank’s becoming law, even though the SEC
arguably did not have the authority to adopt the rule before Dodd-Frank was finalized. See, e.g.,
Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Propose Amendments
Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009klc.htm (“[T]he Commission’s authority to
enact these rules is subject to significant doubt. The Supreme Court has made clear that, in the
absence of an explicit federal law, state law governs the internal affairs of the corporation, and the
D.C. Circuit has held that proxy rules that are substantive, rather than procedural or related to
disclosure, are not valid. As I have discussed, the rules that the Commission proposes today
regulate matters at the heart of corporate law, and thus our authority to adopt them is
questionable.”).
44. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1150.
47. Id. at 1151.
48. Id.
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account of the possibility that the rule would be used to further the special
interests of particular shareholders at the expense of the company. 49 Fifth,
the SEC failed to properly assess net benefits because it did not consider the
degree to which it would simply displace traditional election contests
(rather than encourage new ones).50 Sixth, the SEC used different estimates
about how often the rule would be used in calculating the costs and the
benefits of the rule. 51 Seventh, the SEC did not adequately consider the
degree to which the costs and benefits for investment companies would be
different from the costs and benefits experienced by other companies.52
The Business Roundtable case focused attention on the SEC’s use of
economic analysis. Some argue that the court went too far and imposed
extra-statutory requirements. 53 The SEC, however, faced with Business
Roundtable and its other court losses and juggling a heavy rulemaking load
under Dodd-Frank that could lead to future legal challenges,54 did not
appeal the decision. Instead, it took important steps to improve the quality
of its analysis. In March 2012 (approximately eight months after the
Business Roundtable decision), the SEC’s general counsel and chief
economist issued a joint memorandum to the staff that provides guidance
about how to conduct economic analysis. 55 The guidance explains that
“[h]igh-quality economic analysis . . . ensures that decisions to propose and
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1151–52.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1154–56.
See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of
Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2064 (2013) (arguing that the Business
Roundtable decision imposed requirements on the SEC that are not in the statute); James D. Cox
& Benjamin J. C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s
Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1828 (2012) (arguing that the
D.C. Circuit’s calls for cost-benefit analysis go beyond what the statute demands); Jill E. Fisch,
The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 695, 712 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (“The D.C. Circuit appears to have extended hard look
analysis in Business Roundtable and its predecessor cases by adding a specific requirement
concerning cost-benefit analysis. In Business Roundtable, the court stated that the SEC is required
to ‘apprise itself—and hence the public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a
proposed regulation.’ The source of this additional obligation is unclear.”); Anthony W. Mongone,
Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and Its Implications in a Post-DoddFrank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746, 793 (arguing that, in the face of “extensive
evidence” in support of the SEC’s position, the court should have been more deferential in its
review of the SEC’s decision).
54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). According to one count, the SEC has ninety-five rulemaking
mandates under Dodd-Frank. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT
5 (2012), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7fcba133-a0f9-4f21-99bf058fb1549967/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/49342d7b-2f7f-45ea-b328-0639e232fa85
/Oct2012_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf.
55. Memorandum from the SEC Div. of Risk, Strategy, and Fin. Innovation and the Office of
Gen. Counsel to the Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. and Offices (Mar. 16, 2012) [hereinafter SEC
Guidance],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy
_secrulemaking.pdf.
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adopt rules are informed by the best available information about a rule’s
likely economic consequences, and allows the Commission to meaningfully
compare the proposed action with reasonable alternatives, including the
alternative of not adopting a rule.” 56
The guidance sets forth a fairly robust set of principles for economic
analysis. It is based on the executive orders and the accompanying OIRA
guidance governing economic analysis at executive agencies. 57 The
guidance describes the key components that should be included in the
economic analysis accompanying every SEC rulemaking, namely a
statement of need, identification of a baseline against which to measure the
effects of the regulation, identification of reasonable alternatives, and an
evaluation of the costs and benefits of the proposed regulation and the
alternatives. 58
The first two components of the SEC’s guidance mirror the very first
principle enunciated in Executive Order 12,866: “Each agency shall identify
the problem that it intends to address (including, where applicable, the
failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new action) as
well as assess the significance of that problem.” 59 Circular A-4, OMB’s
guidance to agencies on regulatory analysis, offers more specific
instructions:
If the regulation is designed to correct a significant market failure, you
should describe the failure both qualitatively and (where feasible)
quantitatively . . . . For other interventions, you should also provide a
demonstration of compelling social purpose and the likelihood of effective
action. Although intangible rationales do not need to be quantified, the
analysis should present and evaluate the strengths and limitations of the
60
relevant arguments for these intangible values.

Analysis of the need for the regulation and the baseline are crucial first
steps in regulatory impact analysis. If an agency does not understand the
systemic problem the regulation seeks to solve or how markets are likely to
evolve in the absence of a new regulation, it cannot know whether a new
regulation is actually necessary. If an agency does not understand the root
cause of the systemic problem, it cannot reliably devise an effective
solution, and it may not even recognize the most effective alternative. And
if the agency does not know what problem it is trying to solve or whether
56. Id. at 1.
57. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, supra note 4; Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3; Circular

A-4, supra note 33.
58. SEC Guidance, supra note 55, at 4–15.
59. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3, § 1(b)(1). “Market failure” and “government
failure” are both pieces of economic terminology that have specific meanings; they indicate
situations when markets or the government fails to produce economically efficient results, for
several well-defined reasons. For a highly readable and brief description, see SUSAN E. DUDLEY &
JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 12–20 (2d ed. 2012).
60. Circular A-4, supra note 33, at 4.
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that problem is likely to continue in the future, it cannot reliably estimate
the benefits of a proposed regulation or alternatives. For these reasons, a
thorough analysis of the systemic problem and the baseline are necessary to
determine not just whether a regulation is needed, but also to design an
effective regulation when the agency determines that a regulation is needed,
or when Congress has already directed the agency to issue a regulation.
It is not clear if the SEC has fully committed itself to an analysis of the
systemic problem that is as extensive as OMB has suggested. On the one
hand, the guidance’s section on justification for rulemakings includes a
discussion of market failure, and the section on baselines notes that “where
a statute directs rulemaking, rulewriting staff should consider the overall
economic impacts, including both those attributable to Congressional
mandates and those that result from an exercise of the Commission’s
discretion.” 61 On the other hand, the guidance also mentions that a statutory
requirement for regulation counts as an independent justification for the
regulation, 62 and chief economist Craig Lewis has said the justification for a
regulation can be as basic as “Congress told us to.” 63 Citing a statute,
however, is not the same thing as analyzing a problem. Without identifying
a problem, it will be difficult for the SEC to assess whether a new
regulation is necessary or analyze how effectively different regulatory
approaches will solve the problem.
The guidance also sets out an integrated role in the rulemaking process
for economists—who SEC lawyers typically had brought in only at the end
of the rulemaking process. 64 The SEC’s chief economist explained that the
guidance “lays out a general approach to rulewriting to ensure that
economists are involved at each step of the rule development process, from
the policy development stage—before a release is even drafted—up through
final adoption” and “provid[es] general principles to guide staff . . . as to the
substantive elements of a robust economic analysis.” 65
In addition to the new guidance regarding economic analysis, the SEC
reversed an earlier structural change that had severed the chief economist’s

61. See SEC Guidance, supra note 55, at 8.
62. Id. at 6.
63. See Craig M. Lewis, Chief Economist & Dir., Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation,

SEC, Remarks before the SIFMA Compliance & Legal Society Luncheon: The Expanded Role of
Economists in SEC Rulemaking (Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Lewis Remarks], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch101612cml.htm (“We must define our goals so that we
can then thoughtfully examine the various avenues that are available to us. This can be more
difficult than it sounds. Sometimes it can be clear, as with a specific market failure that cannot be
solved without regulatory intervention. Other times—as we see with the Dodd-Frank Act and the
JOBS Act—Congress has identified a problem for us and directed us to engage in rulemaking to
address it. In that case, the justification for why regulation is necessary can be something as basic
as, ‘Congress told us to.’”).
64. SEC Guidance, supra note 55, at 15–17.
65. Lewis Remarks, supra note 63.
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direct reporting line to the SEC chairman. 66 The direct reporting line was
restored by merging the positions of division director and chief economist,
which once again ensured that the chief economist would have direct
responsibility and accountability to the chairman for economic analysis at
the SEC. 67
In May 2011, Craig Lewis took over as chief economist and director of
the SEC’s Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation, 68 which
was subsequently renamed the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.69
In that capacity, the chief economist has a division reporting to him and
reports directly to the chairman, which presumably gives him greater ability
to influence rulemaking and makes the position a more powerful one at the
SEC. 70
II. RULES SELECTED FOR THIS STUDY
As the SEC implements its new approach to economic analysis, it will
be helpful to have a baseline that indicates the quality of the SEC’s analysis
in the recent past. This Article, through a detailed look at seven SEC
rulemakings finalized before the SEC’s staff issued its new memorandum
guidance in March 2012, 71 identifies some areas in which the SEC’s
analysis is deficient and could be improved. We looked at final rulemakings
so that we could assess the SEC’s analysis at a stage when it had the benefit
of being informed by commenters. To see whether the SEC’s economic
analysis has improved since March 2012, in a subsequent section we also
assess one rule finalized in November 2012.72
66. See, e.g., Jesse Westbrook, SEC Economist Vacancies May Aid Legal Challenges of DoddFrank, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 24, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1124/sec-economist-vacancies-may-aid-legal-challenges-of-dodd-frank.html
(reporting
SEC
Chairman Mary Schapiro’s decision to end direct reporting of chief economist to her and
implications of her decision).
67. Hester Peirce, Economic Analysis by Federal Financial Regulators, 9 GEO. MASON J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 569, 585 (2013).
68. Press Release, SEC, Vanderbilt Professor Craig Lewis Named SEC Chief Economist and
Director of RiskFin Division (May 20, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011
/2011-114.htm.
69. Press Release, SEC, SEC Renames Division Focusing on Economic and Risk Analysis
(June 6, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease
/1365171575272#.UgFl8Kxkj_Y.
70. See Peirce, supra note 67, at 585 (arguing that structural changes “should help give the
SEC’s economists a stronger voice in the agency’s rulemaking and other matters”).
71. Although the July 2011 Business Roundtable decision was a meaningful warning that the
SEC’s economic analysis program needed improvement, the issuance of the guidance was a more
important landmark, as it laid out a uniform approach to economic analysis. For this reason, we
believe that changes in the quality of the SEC’s economic analysis are more likely to be
observable after its issuance, as opposed to immediately after the Business Roundtable decision.
We report infra that there appears to be no significant difference in the quality of SEC regulatory
analysis prior to and after July 2011.
72. Clearing Agency Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 68,080, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,220 (Nov.
2, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Clearing Agency Standards Release].
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The seven pre-guidance rules were selected in a manner intended to
provide a meaningful look at the quality of rules across the SEC’s different
divisions. Using the Government Accountability Office’s Federal Rules
Database, major rules adopted by the SEC were selected. 73 All of the rules
are final rules adopted after a notice of proposed rulemaking and a comment
period. We began the study in February 2012. We selected the two most
recent major rules (by Federal Register publication date) from each of the
SEC’s major rulemaking divisions—the Division of Corporation Finance, 74
the Division of Investment Management, 75 and the Division of Trading and
Markets. 76 One rule (again, the most recent major rule) was selected from
the Division of Enforcement, which does not typically write rules, but was
charged with carrying out a significant Dodd-Frank rulemaking related to
whistleblowing. 77
The purpose of selecting rules from each division was to ensure that we
capture a broad view of rulemaking issues within the SEC’s regulatory
jurisdiction. Each rule is unique, and a complete analysis would require an
assessment of every SEC rulemaking, but selecting major rules from each
division offers a useful cross-section of significant SEC rulemaking. Each
division has its own regulatory agenda that corresponds to the portion of the
73. GAO Federal Rules Database Search, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
http://www.gao.gov/legal/congressact/fedrule.html (within “Agency,” select “Independent
Agencies and Govt Corporations; within “Subagency,” select “United States Securities and
Exchange Commission”; within “Rule Type,” select “Major”; for “Date Published in Federal
Register,” leave start date unchanged and set “To” date at “02/01/2012” click on “Search”; from
list, select first two rules for each rulemaking division, with the exception of the Division of
Enforcement, for which there is only one rule and the Division of Investment Management, for
which one of the two most recent rules is listed under “Subagency” “Commodity Futures Trading
Commission”;
to
determine
responsible
Division,
view
final
rule
at
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/ and search within “For further information contact:” to
identify Division of first listed contact person).
74. Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. 3341, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793-02 (Dec. 29, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 275) [hereinafter Net Worth Standard Release]; Shareholder Approval
of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Securities Act Release No.
9178, Exchange Act Release No. 63,768, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240 and 249) [hereinafter Shareholder Approval Release].
75. Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool
Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisors Act Release No.
3308, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128-01 (Nov. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Reporting by Investment Advisors
Release]; Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter Rules Implementing Amendments Release].
76. Large Trader Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 64,976, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,960 (Aug. 3,
2011) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249) [hereinafter Large Trader Reporting]; Risk
Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access, Exchange Act Release No.
63,241, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,792 (Nov. 15, 2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Risk
Management Controls Release].
77. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release No. 64,545,
76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) [hereinafter
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release].
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SEC’s jurisdiction for which it is responsible. 78 The Office of General
Counsel and Division of Economic and Risk Analysis assist the divisional
rulewriting teams. 79 In addition, selecting rules from each division helps to
capture the differences in approach employed by different division directors
and staff. One of the rules happened to be a joint rule with the CFTC.80 All
of the rules predate the new guidance on economic analysis. All of these
rules were finalized during a very busy period of SEC rulemaking in
fulfillment of the SEC’s mandates under Dodd-Frank. 81 The rules are
summarized in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1. RULES ANALYZED.
Rule
Risk Management
Controls for Brokers
or Dealers with
Market Access
Division of Trading
and Markets
Nov. 15, 2010

Summary of Rule
New Rule 15c-3 under the Exchange Act requires
brokers or dealers offering direct access to an
exchange or alternative trading system (ATS):
• to establish, document, and maintain a
system of risk management controls and
supervisory procedures to limit the financial,
legal, and operational risks of the broker or dealer
and ensure compliance with regulatory
requirements; and
• to craft controls reasonably designed to
prevent the entry of orders that are erroneous,
exceed certain credit and capital thresholds, or
violate regulatory requirements.

78. See SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2013 FINANCIAL REPORT 11 tbl.1.1 (2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2013.pdf (describing responsibilities of each SEC
division).
79. See id. (describing responsibilities of the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis and
Office of General Counsel).
80. Reporting by Investment Advisors Release, supra note 75.
81. See Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—
Accomplishments, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml (last
modified Apr. 18, 2014) (listing rules SEC has proposed or adopted under Dodd-Frank and
relevant Dodd-Frank sections).
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New Rule 13h-1:
• requires large traders to self-identify to
the SEC in order to receive an identification
number;
• requires large traders to provide this
identification number to broker-dealers that effect
transactions on their behalf;
• requires broker-dealers to use the large
trader identification number to maintain records
and report transactions to the SEC; and
• requires monitoring by broker-dealers of
activity that could trigger large trader
requirements.
These new rules and forms under section 21F of
the Exchange Act (section 922 of Dodd-Frank)
establish a new whistleblower program at the
SEC. The new rules establish procedures
governing:
• the reporting of potential securities law
violations to the SEC; and
• the determination and payment of an
award of ten to thirty percent of the total amount
collected by the SEC if the tip leads to a
successful enforcement action by the SEC that
generates more than $1 million in monetary
sanctions.
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Rules Implementing
Amendments to the
Investment Advisers
Act of 1940
Division of
Investment
Management
July 19, 2011

Reporting by
Investment Advisers
to Private Funds and
Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and
Commodity Trading
Advisors on Form PF
Division of
Investment
Management and
CFTC
Nov. 16, 2011
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These amendments to the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) and to Form ADV
largely implement provisions of Dodd-Frank.
Specifically, the new rules:
• provide for the transition of medium-sized
advisers to state registration from SEC
registration;
• require advisers to hedge funds and
certain other private funds to register with the
SEC and provide certain information to the SEC
on Form ADV;
• implement
Dodd-Frank
registration
exemptions for certain foreign advisers and
advisers to venture capital funds and small private
funds;
• require these “exempt reporting advisers”
to file certain reports with the SEC; and
• amend pay-to-play rules and make certain
technical amendments.
This joint SEC-CFTC rulemaking implements
provisions of Title IV of Dodd-Frank.
Specifically, the new rules:
• require investment advisers to one or
more large private funds to file Form PF with the
SEC; and
• require certain commodity pool operators
and commodity trading advisors to file Form PF
with the SEC and allow these entities to satisfy
future CFTC filing requirements with respect to
commodity pools that are not private funds with
the Form PF filing.
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This rulemaking, which implements section
951 of Dodd-Frank:
• requires companies to conduct a separate
shareholder advisory vote to approve executive
compensation;
• requires companies to conduct a vote to
determine how often they will conduct a
shareholder advisory vote on executive
compensation;
• requires companies that are conducting a
shareholder vote on merger and acquisition
transactions to disclose golden parachute
compensation agreements and, in certain cases, to
conduct a shareholder advisory vote on those
arrangements; and
• affords smaller companies an extended
transition period to come into compliance with the
new requirements.
This rulemaking, which implements section
413(a) of Dodd-Frank:
• revises the definition of “accredited
investor” to exclude the value of a person’s
primary residence and certain associated debt
when calculating the person’s net worth; and
• makes a number of related technical
corrections.
This rulemaking, as required by Dodd-Frank,
establishes minimum risk management and
operational standards for registered clearing
agencies, particularly those that act as central
counterparties.

III. EVALUATION OF RULES USING THE MERCATUS
CENTER’S REGULATORY REPORT CARD
One way to assess the quality of SEC regulatory analysis is to use a
standardized scoring system that has already been applied to evaluate the
quality and use of regulatory analysis by other federal agencies. The
Mercatus Center’s Regulatory Report Card has qualitatively assessed the
quality and use of regulatory analysis for proposed, economically
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significant regulations issued by executive branch agencies since 2008.82
Two years of these evaluations (2010 and 2011) are thus roughly
contemporaneous with the period when the seven SEC regulations
described above were developed, proposed, and finalized. The Report Card
consists of twelve criteria grouped into three categories: Openness,
Analysis, and Use. Table 2 lists the twelve criteria, which are derived from
Executive Order 12,866 and OMB Circular A-4.
TABLE 2. REGULATORY ANALYSIS ASSESSMENT CRITERIA.
Openness
1. Accessibility: How easily were the Regulatory Impact Analysis, the
proposed rule, and any supplementary materials found online?
2. Data Documentation: How verifiable are the data used in the analysis?
3. Model Documentation: How verifiable are the models and assumptions
used in the analysis?
4. Clarity: Was the analysis comprehensible to an informed layperson?
Analysis
5. Outcomes: How well does the analysis identify the desired benefits or
other outcomes and demonstrate that the regulation will achieve them?
6. Systemic Problem: How well does the analysis identify and demonstrate
the existence of a market failure or other systemic problem the regulation is
supposed to solve?
7. Alternatives: How well does the analysis assess the effectiveness of
alternative approaches?
8. Benefit-Cost Analysis: How well does the analysis assess costs and
compare them with benefits?
Use
9. Some Use of Analysis: Does the preamble to the proposed rule or the
Regulatory Impact Analysis present evidence that the agency used the
analysis?
10. Cognizance of Net Benefits: Did the agency maximize net benefits or
explain why it chose another option?
11. Measures and Goals: Does the proposed rule establish measures and
goals that can be used to track the regulation’s results in the future?
12. Retrospective Data: Did the agency indicate what data it will use to
assess the regulation’s performance in the future and establish provisions
for doing so?
82. The Report Card methodology is explained in Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin, The
Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis in 2008, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 855, 858–62 (2012). An
explanation of the scoring method and all score data for the Mercatus Regulatory Report Card are
available at Regulatory Report Card, MERCATUS CENTER GEO. MASON U., http://mercatus.org
/reportcards (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
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The Report Card methodology is a middle ground between “checklist”
systems for scoring regulatory analysis 83 and in-depth qualitative case
studies. 84 Expert reviewers trained in the evaluation method assign each
regulatory analysis a Likert Scale (0–5) score. For each criterion, the
evaluators assign a score ranging from 0 (no useful content) to 5
(comprehensive analysis with potential best practices).85 Since there are
twelve criteria, the maximum possible score is 60 points. The scores are
ordinal, not cardinal, and so we caution the reader to interpret the numerical
comparisons below the same way one would interpret student test scores.
An analysis that earns twice as many points as another one is clearly better,
but the numbers should not be interpreted too literally; the analysis with
double the score is not necessarily twice as good.
A 2012 article in the peer-reviewed journal Risk Analysis describes the
Report Card’s methodology and first year’s results; we refer readers to that
article for a more detailed description. 86 Several articles using Report Card
data have been published in scholarly journals. 87 Statistical tests show that
the method produced consistent results from scorers trained in the
evaluation method.88 Report Card findings on the quality of agency

83. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-97-38, AIR POLLUTION: INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN EPA’S REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES CAN BE MADE CLEARER (1997); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-98-142, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES COULD
IMPROVE DEVELOPMENT, DOCUMENTATION, AND CLARITY OF REGULATORY ECONOMIC
ANALYSES (1998); Art Fraas & Randall Lutter, The Challenges of Improving the Economic
Analysis of Pending Regulations: The Experience of OMB Circular A-4, 3 ANN. REV. RES. ECON.
71 (2011); Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies
to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859 (2000); Robert W.
Hahn & Robert E. Litan, How Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 1 REV. ENV.
ECON. & POL’Y 192 (2007); Robert W. Hahn & Robert Litan, Counting Regulatory Benefits and
Costs: Lessons for the U.S. and Europe, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 473 (2005); Stuart Shapiro & John F.
Morrall, III, The Triumph of Regulatory Politics: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Political Salience, 6
REG. & GOVERNANCE 189 (2012).
84. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D.
Morgenstern ed., 1997); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREACRACY (1991); RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE,
REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009); Arthur
Fraas, The Role of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy, 54 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 113 (1991); Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53
DUKE L.J. 1067 (2003).
85. Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 82, at 855–69 (providing an extensive explanation and
justification of the evaluation method).
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., Jerry Ellig et al., Continuity, Change, and Priorities: The Quality and Use of
Regulatory Analysis Across US Administrations, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 153 (2013); Patrick A.
McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of Regulatory Impact
Analysis? Evidence from Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 179
(2011).
88. Ellig et al., supra note 87. An evaluation of inter-rater reliability is available at Regulatory
Report Card, supra note 82.
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regulatory analysis are generally consistent with the results of prior
researchers’ quantitative and qualitative evaluations of RIAs. 89
Several trained Report Card scorers evaluated the SEC regulations that
are the subject of this Article according to the method described above.
These individuals have also evaluated executive branch regulations using
the Report Card methodology. 90 We can thus use the score data to assess
the quality and use of the SEC’s economic analysis and compare it to the
analysis produced by executive branch agencies.91
Evaluators approached the project with no prior expectation about
whether the SEC’s economic analysis was likely to be better or worse than
that of executive branch agencies. On the one hand, judicial review of SEC
analysis could motivate the SEC to produce better analysis than executive
branch agencies. On the other hand, detailed guidance provided by
Executive Order 12,866, OMB Circular A-4, and OIRA review could assist
executive branch agencies in producing better analysis than the SEC.
Table 3 and Figure 1 show the most basic results. The seven pre-2012
SEC regulations scored very poorly, earning an average of 15.7 out of 60
possible points (a score of just 26%). The highest-scoring regulation,
Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, earned just 20 out of 60 possible
points (33%). Interestingly, that rule came out of the SEC’s enforcement
division, a part of the SEC that does not normally write rules. The
regulations scored higher on Openness than on Analysis or Use—largely
because the first Openness criterion assesses whether the regulations and
analysis are easy to find online. The highest scores for the Analysis and Use
categories were 5 points out of 20 possible points (25%).
One anonymous reviewer of a previous version of this Article
suggested that the SEC initiated changes to its economic analysis process
after the July 2011 decision in the proxy access case. If any improvement
occurred as a result of these changes, it is not obvious from the scores in
Table 3. One regulation in our sample was finalized in November 2011, and
another in December, but their average scores are approximately the same
as the other regulations in the sample. Even if the SEC began initiating
changes after July 2011, we suspect it is unlikely that significant effects of

89. Ellig et al., supra note 87.
90. The evaluators were Sherzod Abdukadirov, a research fellow at the Mercatus Center;

James Broughel, the manager of the Report Card project and a doctoral student in economics at
George Mason University; Jerry Ellig, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center and one of
the creators of the Report Card; and Todd Nesbit, assistant professor of economics at Ohio State
University.
91. All of the executive branch regulations used for comparison in this Article were
“prescriptive” regulations that contain mandates or prohibitions. We omitted budget regulations,
which implement federal spending or revenue collection programs. Since the SEC regulations are
prescriptive regulations, not budget regulations, this is the appropriate comparison. The
“prescriptive” term originates from Posner, supra note 84, at 1073.
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those changes would show up in final rules issued just a few months later,
given that those rules were initially proposed in January 2011.
TABLE 3. SEC REGULATIONS’ REPORT CARD SCORES
Date
Whistleblower Incentives
and Protections
Reporting by Investment
Advisers
Executive
Compensation
Risk Management
Controls
Amendments to the
Investment Advisers Act
Large Trader
Reporting
Net Worth Standard for
Accredited Investors

Total

Openness

Analysis

Use

6/13/11

20

11

4

5

11/16/11

18

11

5

2

2/2/11

15

9

3

3

11/15/10

15

9

4

2

7/19/11

14

9

4

1

8/3/11

14

9

3

2

12/24/11

14

8

4

2

Report Card Score (Maximum possible = 20)

FIGURE 1. OPENNESS, ANALYSIS, AND USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN
SEVEN SEC RULES
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Rule Name
Executive Compensation

Reporting by Investemnt Advisors to Private Funds
and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and
Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act

Large Trader Reporting

Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors

Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers
with Market Access

Openness
Analysis
Use
Category of Criteria

Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections

SEC Regulatory Analysis

2014]

383

Figure 2 compares the scores for the SEC regulations with scores for
executive branch regulations. Executive branch agencies often produce
incomplete regulatory impact analysis, averaging just 29.7 out of a
maximum possible 60 points for 2010–11. Nevertheless, this is almost
double the average score for the seven SEC regulations. 92
FIGURE 2. COMPARISON OF SEC AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH RULE
SCORES

Report Card Score
(Maximum possible = 60)

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

2010 Executive Branch 2011 Executive Branch

2010–11 SEC

Figure 3 shows how the SEC regulations compare with executive
branch regulations on the three major categories of criteria in the Report
Card: openness, analysis, and use. The SEC regulations’ scores for quality
of analysis and use of analysis to inform decisions fall far short of both the
maximum possible score and the average scores earned by executive branch
agencies. 93 For both analysis and use of analysis, the executive agencies’
average score was more than twice the SEC’s average score.

92. The differences in means are statistically significant at much greater than the one-percent

level.

93. The differences in means are statistically significant at much greater than the one-percent

level.
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FIGURE 3. OPENNESS, ANALYSIS, AND USE COMPARISON
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The low scores for the SEC regulations might arguably be attributed to
the fact that economic analysis of proposed financial regulations involves
unique difficulties. Former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro took the
following position:
Analyzing the predicted economic effects of proposed rules, while critical
to the rulemaking process, can be challenging. As the GAO noted in its
recent review of Dodd-Frank cost-benefit analyses, “the difficulty of
reliably estimating the costs of regulations to the financial services
industry and the nation has long been recognized, and the benefits of
94
regulation generally are regarded as even more difficult to measure.”

Figure 4 sheds some light on this argument by comparing the SEC
regulations’ average scores with the average scores executive branch
agencies earned for their analysis of financial regulations. Several executive
branch agencies issue regulations that address financial topics, such as the
Department of Labor (pension and retirement savings plans), the
Department of the Treasury (banking), and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (mortgage finance). 95 The Regulatory Report Card
evaluated three executive branch financial regulations in 2010–11 and eight
in 2008–11. We include scores from both time periods in Figure 4 to
94. The SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP,
Fin. Servs. And Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC), (quoting U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS:
IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 19
(2011)); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
AGENCIES 97 (2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland
%20Final%20BCA%20Report%204-30-13.pdf (cataloguing the SEC’s stated reasons for finding
it “difficult to quantify certain regulatory costs and/or benefits,” including the difficulties of
understanding the effects when the SEC is regulating a new area and estimating the benefit of one
rule that is part of an interrelated set of rules).
95. See Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 82, at 864 tbl.IV (listing such regulations).
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provide a larger sample of Report Card regulations for comparison. Even
when compared to the analysis of other agencies’ financial regulations, the
SEC regulations score poorly. 96 In fact, executive branch agencies’ average
scores for financial regulations are about the same as the average scores for
all executive branch regulations.97 Thus, it is doubtful that the low scores
for the SEC regulations reflect some unique difficulties associated with
analyzing financial regulations.
FIGURE 4. EXECUTIVE BRANCH FINANCIAL REGULATIONS OUTSCORE
SEC REGULATIONS
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(Maximum possible = 20)
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The SEC economic analysis memorandum lists four major substantive
requirements for analysis of rulemakings, reproduced in Table 4. Each of
these requirements corresponds to one or more Report Card criteria, or to
one or more sub-questions within a criterion. Therefore, we can compare
the scores on these criteria to see how the SEC is doing on the specific
topics the SEC staff identified as important in the economic analysis
memorandum.

96. The difference in means is statistically significant at the one-percent level for openness and
at much greater than the one-percent level for analysis and use.
97. See Regulatory Report Card, supra note 82.
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TABLE 4. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR REGULATORY ANALYSIS
IN SEC MEMORANDUM
SEC Economic Analysis
Requirement
1. Clearly identify the
justification for the proposed
rule.
2. Define the baseline against
which to measure the proposed
rule’s economic impact.
3. Identify and discuss
reasonable alternatives to the
proposed rule.
4. Analyze the economic
consequences of the proposed
rule and the principal
regulatory alternatives.

Report Card Criterion or Question(s)
Criterion 6: How well does the
analysis demonstrate the existence of a
market failure or other systemic
problem the regulation is supposed to
solve?
Criterion 7, question D: Does the
analysis adequately assess the baseline
– what the state of the world is likely to
be in the absence of further federal
action?
Criterion 7: How well does the
analysis assess the effectiveness of
alternative approaches?
Criterion 5: How well does the
analysis identify the desired outcomes
and demonstrate that the regulation will
achieve them?
Criterion 8: How well does the
analysis assess costs and compare them
with benefits?

Figure 5 demonstrates that the SEC has ample room to improve its
analysis for all of the topics listed in the memorandum. The SEC’s highestscoring topic is discussion of alternatives, where it earned just 1.3 out of a
possible 5 points, compared to an average of 2.7 points earned by executive
branch agencies. On several topics the SEC regulations received average
scores less than 1 point. A score of 1 point means that the analysis made
some assertions about the topic, but provided only cursory argument and
little evidence to back up its claims. Even though the executive branch
agencies often produced seriously incomplete analysis, they always
outscored the SEC substantially on the topics the SEC has identified as
critical to sound economic analysis of rulemakings. 98

98. The differences in means are statistically significant at much greater than the one-percent

level.
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FIGURE 5. HOW SEC COMPARES WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON ISSUES
THE SEC IDENTIFIES AS IMPORTANT
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IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE SEC’S
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Although performing a comprehensive regulatory analysis for the rules
is beyond the scope of this Article, in this Part we endeavor to point out
some ways in which each analysis could have been improved. For each
rule, we suggest ways in which the SEC could have more thoroughly
evaluated the systemic problem it was trying to solve, the available
alternatives, and the economic consequences—three critical components of
the SEC’s staff guidance on economic analysis. The fourth component
mentioned in the guidance—the baseline—is in some cases an important
part of assessing the need for the regulation and in other cases an important
component of assessing alternatives. Where baseline issues are significant,
we consider them as part of our discussion of the systemic problem or
alternatives. As this discussion demonstrates, the SEC could have drawn on
its own expertise, literature, and economic theory in analyzing the rules.
Instead, much of the SEC’s analysis appears to be grounded in the
SEC’s beliefs, the basis for which is generally not provided. The phrase
“we believe” appears an average of forty times in the Federal Register
notices for the seven pre-2012 regulations. In contrast, the same phrase
appears in the notices for the 2010–11 executive branch regulations an
average of ten times—and not at all in the NPRMs and RIAs for twenty-one
executive branch regulations! 99 While this tabulation may to some extent
99. In five of the seven SEC notices, the phrase “we believe” appears between thirty and
ninety-three times.
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reflect merely stylistic differences between agencies, combined with the
SEC’s lower Report Card scores, it suggests that the SEC has been more
willing than executive branch agencies to base decisions on beliefs or
assertions rather than evidence.
Perhaps because the analysis is relatively thin, we find few examples
where the SEC claimed that the economic analysis affected its decisions.
Below, we describe opportunities for improvement that would have been
quite feasible for the SEC to implement, particularly if it had applied the
methodology set forth in the staff guidance. Better analysis, in turn, could
perhaps have led to more effective, more efficient, or less costly
regulations.
A. RISK MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR BROKERS OR DEALERS
WITH MARKET ACCESS
The Risk Management Rule requires brokers and dealers offering their
customers direct access to an exchange or alternative trading system (ATS)
to establish, document, and maintain a system of risk management controls
and supervisory procedures to limit the financial, legal, and operational
risks of the broker or dealer and ensure compliance with regulatory
requirements. 100 Direct access allows customers of a broker-dealer—such as
hedge funds and mutual funds—to conduct electronic trades directly using
the broker-dealer’s access credentials on exchanges or alternative trading
systems, without the delay associated with having the broker-dealer effect
the trade for them. Under the rule, the required controls must be reasonably
designed to prevent the entry of orders that are erroneous, exceed certain
credit and capital thresholds, or violate regulatory requirements. 101 The rule
also includes an annual review requirement and an annual chief executive
officer certification requirement. 102
This rule received a Report Card score of 15 out of 60—close to the
average for the seven pre-guidance rules we reviewed. There is little
evidence in the Federal Register notice that the economic analysis affected
any significant SEC decisions. The SEC’s analysis could have been
improved in several concrete ways that would have made it more useful for
the SEC’s decision-making.
1. Systemic Problem
The SEC failed to identify with precision the nature and extent of the
problem that it was setting out to solve. Instead, the SEC cited the so-called
“flash crash” of May 6, 2010, as evidence that problems can spread quickly
100. Risk Management Controls Release, supra note 76, at 69,795.
101. Id. at 69,794.
102. Id. at 69,811.
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through the securities markets and identified some high-level benefits that it
anticipated as a result of the rule. 103 The notice 104 states that “[t]he
Commission believes that Rule 15c3-5 should reduce the risks faced by
broker-dealers, as well as the markets and financial system as a whole, as a
result of various market access arrangements” but does not explain what
those risks are or attempt to quantify them. 105 The notice cites generally to
the SEC’s desire to prevent “potentially severe, widespread incidents that
could arise as a result of inadequate risk controls on market access.” 106 The
notice also anticipates that “these financial and regulatory risk management
controls should reduce risks associated with market access and thereby
enhance market integrity and investor protection in the securities
markets.” 107 The SEC asserted—rather than established—the link between
market access controls and investor confidence. 108
To obtain a better understanding of the magnitude of the problem, the
SEC could have undertaken a systematic search of erroneous trades and its
relationship to direct customer access using, at least in part, publicly
available data. Indeed, the notice mentions that “certain exchanges provide
a searchable history of erroneous trade cancellations on their website, which
indicate that erroneous trades occur with some regularity.” 109 In addition,
the SEC easily could have obtained additional information about erroneous
trades from the exchanges that the SEC regulates.
Another facet of justifying the rule could have included considering the
extent and adequacy of the controls that the notice acknowledges many
broker-dealers already have in place. 110 If controls such as the automatic
rejection of trades above a certain size or checks to ensure that customers
are not exceeding their credit limits reduce risks, broker-dealers already
have substantial incentives to voluntarily adopt access controls. In framing
the problem, the SEC should have looked at how many broker-dealers had
systems in place and the efficacy of those systems, information that the
SEC could have obtained from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
103. Id. at 69,794. For a discussion of the flash crash, see STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC,
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE
CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES
(2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf.
104. Unless otherwise noted, “notice” refers to a notice of final rulemaking. The SEC typically
uses the alternative term “release.”
105. Risk Management Controls Release, supra note 76, at 69,794.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., id. at 69,823 (“Rule 15c3-5 should promote confidence as well as participation in
the market by enhancing the fair and efficient operation of the U.S. securities markets, thus
promoting capital formation.”).
109. Id. at 69,794 n.16.
110. Id. at 69,798–99 (noting that for certain broker-dealers, the rule’s requirements “should be
substantially satisfied by existing risk management controls and supervisory procedures already
implemented”).
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(FINRA), the quasi-governmental regulatory organization that regulates
broker-dealers. 111 Because the SEC regulates FINRA, it has access to
FINRA data.
2. Alternatives
The SEC did not consider alternatives to the approach it took. Given
that many broker-dealers already implement market access controls, the
SEC could have considered an alternative rule targeted at the firms that do
not currently have such controls. Such an approach would have avoided
imposing additional costs on firms with effective controls in place. The
SEC also could have considered ways to establish incentives for firms to
implement controls without an SEC prescription. For example, a rule
providing that enforcement sanctions would be higher for broker-dealers
that experienced problems and did not have effective controls in place could
be effective at motivating firms to improve their controls. In setting
penalties in its enforcement cases, it is common for the SEC to consider
whether firms made a good faith attempt to establish effective procedures to
prevent illegal conduct.112 Alternatives that rely on, rather than displace,
existing firm rules would also help to avoid one-size-fits-all approaches,
which can diminish the effectiveness and increase the cost of rules.
The SEC also could have looked at the role that exchanges and ATSs
can play in fostering effective risk management. The SEC could have
looked at the rules that govern participation in those venues to see whether
certain rules were more effective than others, as well as whether
adjustments in rules at the exchange/ATS level would suffice. The SEC
recognized a role for other rule makers when it explained that the rule “is
intended to complement and bolster existing rules and guidance issued by
the exchanges and [FINRA]” 113 but did not extend this reasoning to
consider whether those rules could be strengthened. Commenters suggested
placing the onus for risk management on exchanges and ATSs, which—
before the rule was adopted—routinely provided risk management tools to

111. See What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2014) (“FINRA’s mission is to safeguard the investing public against fraud and bad
practices. We pursue that mission by writing and enforcing rules and regulations for every single
brokerage firm and broker in the United States, and by examining broker-dealers for compliance
with our own rules, federal securities laws and rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board.”).
112. See, e.g., Stephen L. Cohen, Assoc. Dir. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks at SCCE’s
Annual
Compliance
&
Ethics
Institute
(Oct.
7,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539872783#.UwOI-NGYbmI (“You need to
be armed with the knowledge of how law enforcement and regulatory agencies value the genuine
efforts undertaken by companies to generate a culture of integrity and respect for the law. We care
and we give credit for those efforts.”).
113. Risk Management Controls Release, supra note 76, at 69,794.
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broker-dealers. 114 The SEC dismissed this option without clearly explaining
why it was inferior to the final rule. 115
3. Economic Consequences
The SEC could have used the fact that there were two sets of firms—
one with controls and one without—to assess the effects the rule would
have. Controlling for other variables, it could have conducted a rigorous
comparison of broker-dealers with and without controls. The results would
have helped to establish not only whether there is a link between absence of
controls and trading problems, but also what the consequences of
mandating controls might be.
B. SECURITIES WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND PROTECTIONS
The Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections rulemaking
implements a new Dodd-Frank regime for processing tips to the SEC and
compensating people who provide original information to the Commission
that forms the basis of successful enforcement actions. 116 In actions that
generate monetary sanctions of more than $1 million, these whistleblowers
must receive ten to thirty percent of the amount collected.117 The basic
elements of the whistleblower program were prescribed by Dodd-Frank, but
the SEC made a number of discretionary decisions about key program
details. 118
This rulemaking received the highest score among the pre-guidance
rules we reviewed. It is also unique in its heavy citation to some of the
relevant whistleblower literature. 119 The volume, breadth, and scope of
academic whistleblower literature reflect the complexity of determining
whether whistleblower programs provide the intended results and, if so,
what characterizes effective whistleblower regimes. The effects of
monetary incentives on a broad range of behaviors, including
whistleblowing, have been widely studied. 120 The SEC should be
commended for looking to some of the relevant literature to guide its
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 69,799 (citing relevant comments).
Id.
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77.
Id. at 34,300, 34,328.
See id. at 34,300.
See, e.g., id. at nn.433, 436, 453, 457, 459.
See, e.g., Edward Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the
Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 627, 627, 659 (1999)
(analyzing 128 studies on the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation across a wide
variety of situations and concluding “that strategies that focus primarily on the use of extrinsic
rewards do, indeed, run a serious risk of diminishing rather than promoting intrinsic motivation”);
Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 589 (2001)
(surveying empirical work on the effects of monetary incentives in a broad range of situations on
intrinsic motivation).
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thinking, but it missed many opportunities to make use of that literature in
its analysis. 121
Much of the available literature critically analyzes and draws lessons
from other whistleblowing statutes. These include the IRS whistleblower
program, which underwent some changes in 2006; the federal False Claims
Act, which has been in existence since the Civil War; the whistleblower
provision in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989; 122 and state false claims acts. 123 The SEC could have taken
greater advantage of other government experiences with whistleblower
programs to design and predict the effects of its program. 124 Where the
SEC’s program is different from its forerunners—for example, the barriers
for SEC whistleblowers are comparatively low—the analysis should have
explored the implications of these differences.125

121. The SEC’s approach resulted in its failure to cite literature, even when it supported the
SEC’s analysis. For example, the SEC cited an article for a secondary point that it could have used
to support its conclusions that monetary awards—even those paid to whistleblowers who are
involved in the illegal conduct—are a useful mechanism for “enhanc[ing] the quality of the
regulatory system governing corporations.” Robert Howse & Ronald J. Daniels, Rewarding
Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits of an Incentive-Based Compliance Strategy, in DECISIONMAKING IN CANADA 525, 539, 545 (Ronald J. Daniels & Randall Morck eds., 1995). The notice
cited this article for the point that tying the award to the penalty amount may provide an incentive
for whistleblowers to delay. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra
note 77, at 34,357 n.439. The article goes on later to present counterarguments on that point, but
the SEC does not cite these counterarguments. Howse & Daniels, supra, at 535–36 (arguing that
the risks that another whistleblower will emerge or that evidence will disappear works to
counteract delay).
122. 12 U.S.C. § 1831k (2012) (permitting banking agencies to award up to “25 percent of the
amount of the fine, penalty, restitution, or forfeiture or $100,000, whichever is less” to a person
who provides original information leading to recovery of criminal fine, restitution, or civil penalty
under relevant banking statutes).
123. See generally Patrick A. Barthle II, Whistling Rogues: A Comparative Analysis of the
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty Program, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201 (2012) (discussing
the history of whistleblower programs); Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do
Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL.
L. REV. 273, 275–83 (1992) (discussing the history of whistleblower programs).
124. The SEC, for example, downplayed the relevance of data generated under the False Claims
Act by pointing to the relative lenience of the SEC’s program. See Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,327 n.232 (“It is not clear that data about
whistleblower behavior under the False Claims Act necessarily will be an accurate predictor of
behavior under our program. The barriers to participation as a False Claims Act whistleblower are
appreciably higher than in our program . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Final
Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Paredes at Opening Meeting to Adopt Final
Rules], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511tap-item2.htm (arguing
that the fact that the SEC’s program is more lenient than the False Claims Act should have served
as a warning “that the final rule does not do enough to efficiently filter out lower-quality
submissions”).
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1. Systemic Problem
The whistleblower rule was mandated by Congress, and the SEC did
not analyze the problem it was trying to solve. Even before the
whistleblower rule was in effect, the SEC received many tips from
whistleblowers, 126 so the problem might have been the SEC’s inability to
effectively identify tips worth pursuing. Encouraging more tips through a
whistleblower program would not solve that problem, and could make it
worse. The SEC’s pre-Dodd-Frank whistleblower compensation program
was quite limited in scope,127 so the SEC could have compared the volume,
timeliness, and quality of its own tips to the volume, timeliness, and quality
of tips received by other agencies with more generous whistleblower
programs to assess whether there was a problem that needed to be solved.
One experimental study found, for example, that the need for awards falls
with the perceived severity of the wrongdoing and concluded, “In areas
where the misconduct is likely to be viewed, at least by some of the people,
as severe, there is less need to use rewards that carry both monetary costs
for the state and some social costs for the whistle-blower herself.” 128 In any
case, thinking through the nature and extent of the problem would have
helped the SEC to craft a more effective whistleblower program.
2. Alternatives
Assuming that the problem that the rule was designed to solve is that
the SEC is not receiving adequate, high-quality tips, there are alternatives to
monetary whistleblower awards. For example, the SEC could have looked
at the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) on
whistleblowing—which included a new avenue for people with accounting
and auditing complaints to raise them with the audit committee, as well as
new protections for accounting whistleblowers against retaliation—and
considered whether a preferable alternative to the rule would have been
enhanced protections for whistleblowers. 129 The adopting release noted
126. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Names New Specialized Unit Chiefs and Head of New
Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010
/2010-5.htm (discussing the new Office of Market Intelligence, which was created to handle “the
thousands of tips, complaints and referrals received by the SEC each year”).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (permitting the SEC to pay bounties for insider trading tips); see also
SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., NO. 474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM
(2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2010/474.pdf (assessing
the effectiveness of the SEC’s pre-Dodd-Frank whistleblower program in light of other
government agencies’ programs and making recommendations for improving it).
128. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 1151, 1204–05 (2010) (describing the social cost to the whistleblower as the social stigma
associated with monetary awards).
129. One study that the SEC cited for another point looked at fraud cases before and after
Sarbanes-Oxley and found that “SOX’s protection for whistleblowers has not increased
employees’ incentives to come forward with cases of fraud” but noted, “This is not to say that the
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s emphasis on effective internal whistleblowing
frameworks but stopped short of exploring the degree to which prior
government efforts to encourage whistleblowing had been
successful. 130Another alternative to whistleblowing that has been suggested
in the literature and should have been considered by the SEC is permitting
insider trading on information about corporate misconduct.131 Offering
lower penalties to people involved in securities law violations who report
them to the SEC might be another reasonable alternative to a whistleblower
award program.
The SEC did consider some different ways of crafting whistleblower
awards. For example, the SEC, in explaining its decision not to mandate
that whistleblowers report to internal compliance programs before or at the
same time as they report to the SEC, 132 explicitly referred to the economic
analysis section. 133 In the rules we reviewed, this is one of the few instances
in which economic analysis seems to have played an explicit role in the
decision-making process. The economic analysis suggested that mandatory
internal reporting could discourage some whistleblowers who might be
willing to report to the SEC but fear reprisal or other harassment if they
report internally. 134 It is not clear if this economic analysis was done before
the Commission made its decision, but it is difficult to see how the SEC
could have made the decision without employing logic similar to the
economic analysis. For this use of economic reasoning in one facet of the
regulation, the whistleblower regulation received a score of 3 points on the
Report Card criterion that assesses whether the Commission claimed to use
the economic analysis in any decisions. This is the highest score any of the
SEC regulations achieved for this criterion.
Despite this relative strength, the whistleblower regulation’s economic
analysis failed to consider as an alternative mandatory internal reporting,
legislation has not influenced employee whistleblowing by other measures.” Alexander Dyck et
al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2250 (2010).
130. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,326
n.230 (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements but noting that, in Dodd-Frank, “Congress
chose a wholly different model—one that provides financial incentives for employees and others
to report violations directly to the Commission.”).
131. See Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1921 (2007) (“Insider trading can
accomplish the same socially desirable results as whistleblowing.”); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp,
Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 151–53 (2007) (discussing the possibility of permitting
whistleblowers to engage in insider trading as one way of motivating whistleblowers—the point
for which the SEC cited Professor Rapp’s article).
132. The SEC explained that “the final rule relies on whistleblowers to determine whether
reporting potential securities violations internally would be appropriate or desirable at their entity
. . . .” Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,331
n.274.
133. Id. at 34,326 n.225.
134. Id. at 34,361 n.459.
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together with rewards for whistleblowers who report internally but not to
the SEC. Such an approach might have been a way to minimize costs to the
SEC, 135 whistleblowers, 136 and companies. 137 In support of its decision not
to require mandatory internal reporting, the SEC relied on articles that
argued generally in favor of monetary awards as a means for compensating
whistleblowers for the adverse consequences of whistleblowing but did not
address the specific issue of allowing rewards for whistleblowers who
report only internally. 138 For insight in this area, the SEC could have looked
at different state experiences.139 The SEC also could have considered
alternatives to mandated awards of ten to thirty percent of monetary
sanctions. 140 Although the statute prescribed this range, considering
135. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement Regarding the Adoption of Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Statement of Casey on Adoption of Rules], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511klc-item2.htm. (“Unlike a company engaged in
the act of self-policing, the Division must observe numerous legal formalities that are required of
government actors. As a consequence, the public investigative process can be substantially more
ponderous and time-consuming than private investigative processes. And there is a danger in not
addressing matters quickly and decisively. By diverting tips and complaints from private channels
to the Commission, we may end up permitting violations to last longer and grow more serious.”).
136. See, e.g., James Gobert & Maurice Punch, Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, 63 MOD. L. REV. 25, 53 (2000) (looking at benefits and
drawbacks of whistleblowing in the context of a British whistleblower protection statute and
noting one potential drawback of governmental encouragement of whistleblowing: “In a society
where one cannot distinguish between friends, neighbours and co-workers, on the one hand, and
government informers, on the other, social cohesion and trust are likely to become the victims”).
An article cited several times in the notice discusses that many whistleblowers, “likely driven by
[their] sense of loyalty,” may prefer internal whistleblowing to external whistleblowing. See
Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley: Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers,
2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1142. Another article, cited by the SEC in support of another point,
suggests that companies could mitigate the “conflict of interest” that monetary awards pose for the
employee motivated by loyalty to his company by offering monetary awards to internal
whistleblowers. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 123, at 335.
137. See Moberly, supra note 136, at 1156–57 (explaining that whistleblower error, which may
be intentional or unintentional, is a cost of whistleblowing, but that the cost may be lower for
companies if the erroneous tip is handled internally).
138. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,361
n.459 and accompanying text (citing Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the
Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 905, 948–59 (2002); Luigi Zingales, Want to Stop Corporate
Fraud? Pay Off Those Whistle-Blowers, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at B2).
139. See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 262–63 (arguing, based on an assessment of state laws, that
provisions requiring internal mandatory reporting, if “balanced by more liberal remedies for
whistleblowers who suffer retaliation when they proceed internally . . . , would be approaching a
well-balanced and useful whistleblowing statute”); Gerard Sinzdak, Whistleblower Laws:
Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1668
(arguing for more flexibility, including allowing rewards to be made to whistleblowers who use
either internal or external channels exclusively, based on an assessment of state whistleblower
statutes).
140. The SEC does not, for example, appear to have considered the arguments made in a
lengthy comment by David Ebersole, which was later published in a law review. He addressed
many aspects of the statute and proposed rules. Among the concerns he raised was the ten percent
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different formulations could have provided useful information to the SEC,
the public, and Congress.
3. Economic Consequences
The notice does not include a thorough, supported analysis of the rule’s
costs and benefits. Its statements about costs and benefits appear to be
based largely on conjecture rather than on academic literature or
experiences from other whistleblower programs. The SEC relied on staff
expectation to determine some direct costs.141 To gain a better
understanding of indirect costs, the SEC could have drawn from insights
about costs and benefits from a well-researched study that it cited for the
proposition that monetary awards would increase the whistleblower pool. 142
An important indirect cost of the rule could be the effect on companies’
internal compliance programs. The SEC used literature arguing that
whistleblowers are motivated by non-monetary factors to contend that
whistleblowers would continue to report internally, despite the availability
of the SEC’s whistleblower awards, yet also used literature on the
importance of monetary awards to support the prediction that the SEC’s
rule—which takes internal reporting into account when determining award
size—would encourage more internal reporting. 143 To justify this conflict,
the SEC raised the possibility that there are two sets of whistleblowers—
one that is motivated by money and one that is not—and explained that the
rule would work for both groups, but in doing so the SEC did not

floor on awards. David Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions,
6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 143 (2011) (“[A]lthough whistleblower bounties
are likely to be unnecessarily high with little marginal utility, they ironically may not provide
certainty as intended.”).
141. See, e.g., Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at
34,354 n.422 (“This number is a staff estimate based upon the expectation that roughly 10 percent
of all tips received by the Commission will be submitted in hard copy . . . .”); id. at 34,355 n.427
(basing its estimate that five percent or fewer whistleblowers would pay their lawyers hourly fees
rather than contingency fees “in part, on the Commission’s belief that most whistleblowers likely
will not retain counsel to assist them in preparing the forms”).
142. See id. at 34,360 n.457 (citing Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 123, at 284). Callahan and
Dworkin found that the effectiveness of an award turns on the nature of the grantor and award.
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 123, at 296–97. They also noted that there are “practical costs
associated with this privatization of the law enforcement function, in addition to the policy
concerns.” Id. at 336.
143. Compare Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at
34,360 & n.453 (citing literature finding that whistleblowers are not financially motivated in
support of the conclusion that whistleblowers would not be induced by financial incentives to
report to the SEC rather than internally), with id. at 34,360 & n.457 (“The financial incentives
offered by the final rules to report internally should induce individuals to report who, absent any
financial incentive, would never have reported either internally or to the Commission.”).
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adequately explore the strength of its underlying assumptions about the
existence and likely behavior of these two groups.144
The SEC goes so far as to suggest that the whistleblower rule will help
companies, but the Commission does not offer support for this expectation.
The agency anticipated, for example, that the rule’s monetary awards
“should increase the likelihood that individuals will report misconduct to
effective internal reporting programs” and hence the likelihood that
companies would invest more in improving their compliance programs. 145
The notice asserts that companies that “may previously have underinvested
in internal compliance programs may respond by . . . strengthening their
internal compliance programs,” which “will involve costs on companies,”
but “there should be an overall increased efficiency from the perspective of
investors to the extent that these companies achieve a more optimal
investment in these programs.” 146 The SEC does not provide evidence that
companies are underinvesting now in internal compliance or that the
existence of the whistleblower program will incentivize the optimal amount
of investment in internal compliance at underinvesting companies.
Although the SEC could get access to information about typical defense
costs, it instead “makes no effort to quantify with specificity the impact of .
. . the defense costs of companies . . . as they are forced to hire outside
counsel to represent them before the Division of Enforcement.” 147
The SEC also failed to fully consider the implications that a
whistleblowing program could have on the attorney-client relationship.
Attorney-client privilege considerations led the SEC generally to preclude
awards based on attorney-client information. 148 Nevertheless, the SEC did
not consider the extent to which permitting attorneys to be paid for
whistleblowing, albeit under limited circumstances, could “cloud their
professional judgment.” 149 As another example, the rules permit the SEC
staff to communicate directly with whistleblowers rather than
144. See id. at 34,360 (explaining that “we have tailored the final rules to provide
whistleblowers who are otherwise pre-disposed to report internally, but who may also be affected
by financial incentives, with additional economic incentives to continue to report internally”).
145. Id. at 34,325–26.
146. Id. at 34,362. The notice cites an article in support of the possibility that its rules would
cause issuers that had underinvested in corporate governance to make “improvements in corporate
governance generally,” id., but that article found that governance improvements only occurred in
the firms that were “exposed in the press,” which is not a component of the SEC’s whistleblowing
program. Id. at 34,362 n.467 (citing Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle-Blowing Target Firm
Characteristics and Economic Consequences, 85 ACCT. REV. 1239, 1266 (2010).
147. Statement of Casey on Adoption of Rules, supra note 135.
148. See Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,313 n.117
(explaining general exclusion of “information received in breach of the attorney-client privilege”
because “the attorney-client privilege stands apart because of the significance of attorney-client
communications for achieving compliance with the Federal securities laws”).
149. Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits, Lawyers as Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform Act: Ethical Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC
Rules, 84 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 12 (2012).
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communicating through the attorney for the whistleblower’s employer, as
would normally be required. 150 The notice explains, “We believe that these
rules provide benefits by ensuring that whistleblowers are able to work with
the Commission as it takes actions in response to possible securities law
violations, and thus justify any costs on companies.” 151 The so-called nocontact rule—the prohibition on going around a company’s counsel and
speaking directly with a company employee—is a fundamental rule
governing attorney conduct. 152 The SEC should have drawn on the literature
exploring that prohibition and the experiences of other government agencies
to better understand the costs and benefits of lifting the prohibition in the
whistleblower context. 153 In addition, the Commission should have
considered the effect that the rule’s provisions related to whistleblower
lawyers would have on the efficacy and cost of the rule.
The SEC did not adequately consider the potential costs of the
whistleblower program to investors and the government, acknowledging
that “whistleblowers might be paid with monies that otherwise could be
distributed to victims” but making no effort to look at the resultant costs. 154
Commissioner Paredes, citing to the higher thresholds for submissions
under the False Claims Act, expressed concern that the rule would impose
costs on the SEC in the form of “an excessive flow of lower-quality tips to
the Commission,” which could then divert the SEC’s time and resources
from more important matters.155 The government’s resource commitment to
sorting through and following up on complaints is likely to be large, 156 and
the SEC did not fully analyze this commitment.
The SEC’s failure to conduct a thorough regulatory analysis for the
whistleblower rule is especially notable because of the broad availability of
academic work in this area, much of which is based on evaluations of other
150. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(b) (2014).
151. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,358.
152. See
MODEL
R.
PROF’L
CONDUCT
4.2
n.7,
available

at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_prof
essional_conduct/rule_4_2_communication_with_person_represented_by_counsel.html
(explaining, “In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications with a
constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the
organization’s lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with
respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to
the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.”).
153. See, e.g., Alafair S. R. Burke, Reconciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutorial Power:
The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1635 (1994); Joan Colson, Comment, Rule of
Ethics or Substantive Law: Who Controls an Individual’s Right to Choose a Lawyer in Today’s
Corporate Environment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1265 (2005).
154. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,348.
155. Statement of Paredes at Opening Meeting to Adopt Final Rules, supra note 125.
156. Bucy, supra note 138, at 967; see also Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic
Model of Whistleblower Policy, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 157 (2009) (demonstrating the importance
of understanding whistleblower motives in shaping the appropriate governmental response to
tips).
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whistleblower programs. 157 Although the adopting release cited much of
this work, it did not use it to form the basis of a comprehensive look at the
need for a whistleblower program and the elements that should be included
in the design of such a program. This failure could result in an ineffective
whistleblower program or one that produces unintended negative
consequences. 158
C. SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
GOLDEN PARACHUTE COMPENSATION
The Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden
Parachute Compensation rulemaking was mandated by section 951 of
Dodd-Frank. 159 The rule requires companies to conduct shareholder
advisory votes on (1) executive compensation, (2) the frequency of this
executive compensation vote, and (3) golden parachute agreements in
connection with mergers and acquisitions.160 Although the votes are
nonbinding, the SEC added a requirement that companies disclose whether
and how they have taken shareholder advisory votes into account. 161 DoddFrank permitted the Commission to exempt any “issuer or class of issuers”
from these requirements.162 The SEC provided only a temporary exemption
for small companies (which Dodd-Frank explicitly mentioned as potential
candidates for exemption) with respect to one portion of the rule. 163
This rule received a Report Card score of 15 out of 60—close to the
average for the seven pre-guidance rules we reviewed. The SEC’s analysis
was hampered by its reliance on the statutory mandate to justify the
portions of the rulemaking that were not explicitly discretionary. The fact
that Dodd-Frank mandated a particular course of action for the SEC does
not alter the need for the SEC to understand the problem it is trying to
solve. An understanding of the nature of the problem is essential in order to
determine whether a proposed solution will work. Likewise, the fact that
157. For a sampling of this literature, see supra notes 126–140.
158. See, e.g., Feldman & Lobel, supra note 128, at 1154 (“Most strikingly, our findings

suggest that legal incentives to report are frequently ill-designed and can in fact be inadvertently
counterproductive.”).
159. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 6016 (discussing rationale for the requirement that companies disclose “whether
and, if so, how their compensation policies and decisions have taken into account the results of the
most recent shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation”).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(e) (2012). The SEC also has general exemptive authority under the
Securities Exchange Act. Id. § 78mm.
163. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6031 (discussing rationale for temporary
exemption); but see Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt a Final
Rule Regarding Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011
0/spch012511tap-3.htm (recommending permanent exemption for small and newly public
companies).
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Dodd-Frank mandated a particular solution to the problem does not alter the
need to look at alternatives. The SEC has exemptive authority that allows it
some leeway to depart from the mandate,164 but even if it were not to
exercise that authority, the agency, Congress, and the public should know
whether there is a preferable alternative to the one set forth in Dodd-Frank.
Congress has the ability to veto agency rules under the Congressional
Review Act, 165 and one obvious thing legislators may want to know in order
to decide whether to use that veto power is whether there is a better
alternative available.
In a more thorough consideration, the SEC could have taken advantage
of a large literature on executive compensation and corporate governance.
Among other things, academics have looked extensively at issues related to
agency problems and asymmetric information in the governance of publicly
held corporations. 166 The SEC would have had to look at this literature in
the context of its existing mandates, including extensive compensation
disclosure requirements.
1. Systemic Problem
The notice explains that the rules will provide companies with clarity
about how to comply with the statute and will facilitate investor decisionmaking 167 but does not explore whether there was a problem justifying the
rule’s voting and disclosure mandates. To the contrary, some of the SEC’s
analysis suggests there may not have been a problem. For example, with
respect to golden parachute disclosure, the SEC acknowledged that “our
existing disclosure requirements include much of this disclosure.” 168
Similarly, the SEC’s conclusion that new tabular disclosure requirements
for executive compensation would impose only “limited” costs since the
same information “is currently required to be disclosed in narrative format”
raises questions about the necessity for the new disclosure.169
In addition to looking at the adequacy of its existing executive
compensation disclosure requirements, the SEC also ought to have looked
beyond its regulatory framework to determine whether other private or
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(e).
165. 5 U.S.C. § 802.
166. For a general introduction to the literature, see ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS,

THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S.
Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV. FIN. STUDS. 939 (2010). See
also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive
Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); Eugene F. Fama & Michael
C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Andrei Shleifer &
Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
167. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6038–39.
168. Id. at 6039.
169. Id.
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government solutions were effectively at work. If boards of directors set
executive compensation in light of market factors, there may not be a need
for the government to take further steps such as those taken in this
rulemaking. 170 As part of understanding whether there was a problem to be
solved, the SEC also would have needed to look at the efficacy of existing
mechanisms—including state law and exchange-listing requirements—for
shareholders to monitor and control board and management activities.171
2. Alternatives
The adopting release did not consider viable alternatives to the rule.
The SEC could have looked at ways to foster improved corporate
governance through internal corporate mechanisms, which would have
allowed for better tailoring to individual company characteristics. As an
alternative to mandatory votes, the SEC could have considered opt-in or
opt-out procedures to allow for more flexible implementation.172 An
alternative to a uniform rule would have been a rule scaled to size or limited
to the biggest companies. 173 The SEC also could have considered the costs
and benefits of modifying its existing disclosure requirements to provide
any additional necessary information to investors without also requiring
shareholder advisory votes.

170. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., May 2008,
at 15, available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.kaplan/research/kceo.pdf (arguing that
market forces, board oversight, existing SEC disclosure rules, and existing avenues for
shareholders to express discontent obviate the need for a mandatory, non-binding shareholder vote
on executive compensation).
171. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1809–10 (2011) (discussing the “immense” literature on
whether executive compensation is properly linked with performance and concluding that a
regulatory solution was not warranted because “[t]he core premise behind say-on-pay remains, at
best, unproven”); Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 758 (2013) (arguing that, with respect to Dodd-Frank’s sayon-pay provision, “[f]ederalism thus directly interferes with Delaware’s private ordering
approach”); see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law:
Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1834–35 (2006) (recommending that on an
issue-by-issue basis, “federal policymakers should examine whether: (1) the existing state law
arrangement is optimal, and (2) any of the tools that are now unavailable at the state level—rules,
agency involvement, public enforcement, criminalization, duties on agents not subject to the
jurisdiction of the state of incorporation—would be superior. Most importantly, this review should
not proceed under the prevailing strong presumption that corporate affairs should normally be left
to state law absent compelling reasons to intervene.”).
172. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in
Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 834
(recommending an opt-in approach); Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive
Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 417 (2011) (recommending an opt-out approach).
173. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the
Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 323 (2009) (discussing differences between
small and large firms that could affect the benefits generated by particular compensation rules).
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3. Economic Consequences
The SEC’s analysis of costs and benefits of the rulemaking is not
thorough because it focuses largely on the elements of the rules over which
the SEC had discretion. In some cases, the SEC’s burden estimates are quite
precise (e.g., $400 per hour for “outside professionals” to prepare
disclosures) 174 but are not sourced. Moreover, the SEC did not take into
account non-paperwork costs, such as the costs of hiring outside
consultants, 175 because those costs are attributable to the statutory mandate
rather than the implementing rules.176
The discussion of costs largely ignores potential costs of the rule that
are harder to quantify. The new advisory votes mandated by the rule are a
step towards the federalization of corporate law, thus potentially imposing
greater costs on corporations and their investors than would a state law
regime. 177 The SEC’s analysis omits any discussion of the fact that more
disclosure is not always preferable for investors and could be harmful to
them. 178 The SEC does not consider whether the additional disclosures will
impose costs on investors. Extraneous disclosures can distract investors’
attention from more important items. 179 An item that receives great
174. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6035.
175. The Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness raised some of

these additional costs in its comment letter. Letter from David T. Hirschmann, President and Chief
Exec. Officer, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 18, 2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments
/s7-31-10/s73110-47.pdf.
176. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6039 (“Our analysis of the costs of the
amendments we are adopting today relates to the incremental direct and indirect costs arising from
the requirements in our rule amendments. The analysis below does not reflect any additional direct
or indirect costs arising from new Exchange Act Section 14A, including the shareholder advisory
votes on say-on-pay, frequency, and golden parachute compensation, and any likely additional
costs which would be incurred because of these votes.”).
177. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 171, at 782 (“State regulation of corporate governance and
Delaware corporate law in particular offer substantive and structural advantages over federal
regulation. These advantages include specialized lawmaking structures with expertise in business
law issues, the capacity to respond to market and legal developments, and the ability to tailor
governance structures to firm- specific needs and characteristics.”).
178. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff & Claire M. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 599, 624 (2013) (arguing that, rather than informing investors, executive compensation
disclosure may benefit executives, who “can use fuller access to the details about compensation of
their peers in negotiations to ratchet up their pay”); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of
Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 511 (2007) (arguing
that disclosure mandates impose costs, including “unintended behavioral responses [that] may
whittle away the value of increased disclosure”); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417
(2003) (arguing that disclosure mandates should not be imposed without thinking about the users
of the information, who may suffer from information overload).
179. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976) (“Some information is of
such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good .
. . . [I]f the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the corporation and its
management be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements, but also
management’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the
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emphasis in SEC-mandated disclosures may figure more heavily into
investment decisions than it would have absent the disclosure emphasis.
This phenomenon is intensified in the area of corporate disclosures because
of the involvement of proxy advisory firms. 180 Proxy advisory firms, which
provide voting recommendations, focus heavily on executive compensation
issues, 181 so they could drive investors to pay even more attention to these
items than they otherwise would. 182
The SEC’s discussion of benefits is largely speculative. The notice
states, for example, that the rulemaking “will benefit shareholders and other
market participants by providing potentially useful information for voting
and investment decisions.” 183 Similarly, the SEC speculates, “By providing
disclosure of the full scope of golden parachute compensation, we believe
issuers will provide more detailed, comprehensive, and useful information
to shareholders to consider when making their voting or investment
decisions.” 184 As noted above, this discussion assumes that existing
disclosures are inadequate without explaining why that is the case. Without
more information, it is not clear if the SEC is correct in concluding that “the
amendments we are adopting should improve the ability of investors to
make informed voting and investment decisions, and, therefore lead to
increased efficiency and competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets.” 185
With respect to both costs and benefits, the SEC could have looked to
the experiences of companies that obtained government funding through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Entities with outstanding TARP
funds were required to permit a separate shareholder vote on executive
compensation. 186 The SEC noted the similarity of the requirement 187 but did
not draw on companies’ experience with TARP (albeit limited given that
the TARP requirement had only recently been imposed) to better
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking.”).
180. See Fisch, supra note 171, at 754–55 (discussing the role of proxy advisory firms in
influencing say-on-pay advisory votes).
181. James K. Glassman & J. W. Verret, How to Fix Our Broken Proxy Advisory System,
MERCATUS CENTER GEO. MASON U., 14–15 (Apr. 16, 2013), http://mercatus.org/sites/default
/files/Glassman_ProxyAdvisorySystem_04152013.pdf (discussing proxy advisors’ focus on sayon-pay issues).
182. For a discussion of reliance on proxy advisors, see Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC,
Remarks at Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals (July 11, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539700301#.Uv-WwnmA2P8
(arguing, among other things, that “[a]nother unintended consequence of the increase in mandated
disclosure is the rise of proxy advisory firms and the increasing willingness of investment advisers
and large institutional investors to rely on such firms in order to ostensibly carry out their
fiduciary duties”).
183. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6038.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 6040–41.
186. 12 U.S.C. § 5221(e) (2012).
187. Shareholder Approval Release, supra note 74, at 6023.
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understand its implications. The SEC also could have looked at the United
Kingdom’s experience with say-on-pay. 188
D. LARGE TRADER REPORTING
The Large Trader Reporting rulemaking requires large traders, as
measured by the volume or value of their trading, to identify themselves to
the SEC, provide extensive information to the SEC, and obtain from the
SEC an identification number. 189 The large trader must supply this
identification number to its registered broker-dealers for use in their
recordkeeping and reporting to the SEC. 190 The rulemaking also requires
broker-dealers to monitor for unidentified large traders. 191 The rulemaking
was authorized under section 13(h) of the Exchange Act 192 and motivated
by the Commission’s desire to have better information about market
transactions. 193 The SEC adopted the rule—which had already been
proposed—shortly after the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010, rattled the agency
and markets and raised questions about the SEC’s ability to reconstruct
market events. 194 This rule received a Report Card score of 14 out of 60,
which made it one of the lowest-scoring rules in our sample.
1. Systemic Problem
The SEC, in its notice, made an attempt to outline a problem by
pointing to gaps in its current information collection system, the Electronic
Blue Sheets. 195 Existing blue sheet data did not allow the SEC to trace a
transaction to a particular trader or identify when it occurred.196 Moreover,
the SEC pointed to the fact that data were not required to be available to the
SEC the day after a transaction occurs. 197 The SEC asserted that these
shortcomings in the blue sheet data were the problem it was trying to solve
but did not take the analysis to the necessary next step and explain how
having the data would solve a problem in market function. If mere lack of
access to information were the type of problem the SEC needed to solve
through rulemaking, the SEC could cite that as the basis for an infinite
number of rulemakings. Rather than simply expressing an expectation “that
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Gordon, supra note 173.
Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76.
Id. at 46,969–72 (describing duties of large traders).
Id. at 46,979 (summarizing monitoring requirements).
Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, § 3, 104 Stat. 963, 964–66 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(h)).
193. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,960–61 (explaining that the rule will
enhance the SEC’s ability to collect information about active traders).
194. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections Release, supra note 77, at 34,300,
34,328.
195. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,961.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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investors should likewise benefit as a consequence of the Commission’s
enhanced access to information,” 198 the SEC should have explored how
having the missing information would enhance the SEC’s ability to
facilitate well-functioning markets. The SEC could have analyzed, for
example, how its response to the flash crash would have been different with
access to large trader information. Moreover, instead of simply pointing to
the apparently “increasingly prominent role” of large traders, 199 the SEC
should have considered more thoroughly what had changed to make the
data necessary; Congress first gave the SEC authority to request the
information in 1990, 200 but the SEC waited until 2011 to finalize a rule.
The SEC’s failure to pinpoint the problem it was attempting to solve
made the development of an effective solution more difficult. For example,
the SEC’s decision to require aggregation among companies with a
common parent, regardless of whether there is coordination of investment
discretion, could undermine the value of the information for purposes of
reconstructing market events. 201 The SEC mentioned the fact that the CFTC
has a large trader reporting requirement 202 but did not look to the CFTC’s
long experience with this requirement to explain the SEC’s need for a
similar obligation.
2. Alternatives
The SEC appears to have settled on its solution without giving evenhanded consideration to alternatives. The Commission could have looked at
modifying other SEC or FINRA information collection requirements. The
SEC also could have considered a coordinated approach with international
regulators interested in the same type of information. One commenter
suggested relying on changes to FINRA’s Order Audit Trail System
(OATS) instead of making changes to the SEC’s Electronic Blue Sheets. 203
FINRA, which is the frontline regulator of brokers, maintains an audit trail
system that “is designed to capture all of the events in the lifecycle of an

198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 46,993–94.
Id. at 46,993.
Id. at 46,961 & n.9.
See id. at 46,965 (explaining decision to apply at the parent level regardless of where the
investment discretion lies); see also Letter from Jennifer S. Choi, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Inv.
Advisers Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 4 (June 22, 2010) (“Transaction data that
consolidate trading activity of affiliates that do not coordinate investment decisions or trading
strategies or even share information about investment decisions would present at best an
inaccurate, and at worst a misleading, picture to the Commission of the trading activity of a large
trader.”).
202. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,978.
203. See Letter from Ann L. Vlcek, Managing Dir. and Assoc. Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 5–6 (June 24, 2010), available at
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=907.
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order from origination or receipt through execution and/or cancellation.” 204
This audit system might have been modified to obtain the information
sought by the SEC with respect to large traders. Instead of giving that
option due consideration in response to a commenter’s suggestion, the SEC
took the commenter’s cost estimates out of context and concluded that the
commenter’s letter did not support the OATS alternative. 205 The commenter
preferred OATS because it anticipated that OATS investments would
generate greater benefits in the long term and reduce future expenditures in
connection with the anticipated consolidated audit trail rulemaking. 206 The
consolidated audit trail rulemaking, then under consideration and
subsequently adopted by the SEC, is an initiative intended to provide for the
collection of comprehensive trade data across market venues and is thus
related to the large trader reporting rule. 207
Alternatively, the SEC could have considered the option of deferring its
large trader information requests and incorporating them directly into the
consolidated audit trail rulemaking. The notice included a brief discussion
of the consolidated audit trail rulemaking but argued that the large trader
rule was a necessary, near-term way to get the SEC the information it
needed. 208 The adopting release did not take into account the potential costs
associated with implementing two such closely related rules in quick
succession.
The SEC also could have considered adopting a more limited form of
the rule. For example, it could have required large traders to identify
themselves only after they had established a pattern of engaging in large
trades. The SEC could have considered other ways to limit the reach of the
definition of “large trader” to better capture the types of traders in which it
was interested. With respect to foreign large traders, the SEC could have

204. Order Audit Trail System (OATS): OATS Basics, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry
/Compliance/MarketTransparency/OATS/PhaseIII/p016184 (last visited Apr. 11, 2014) (slide 3).
205. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,990 (pointing out that the commenter
who had suggested the OATS alternative had also provided an estimate from a firm that indicated
the OATS alternative would be more expensive). That commenter explained that “using the
electronic blue sheets would require only slightly less investment and time to implement, but that
investment and time would be of limited benefit to the SEC’s larger goal of the consolidated audit
trail and firms’ build-out for the consolidated audit trail.” Letter from Ann L. Vlcek, supra note
203, at 6.
206. See Letter from Ann L. Vlcek, supra note 203, at 4 (arguing that, because future audit trail
initiatives would be more likely to build upon OATS than upon the SEC’s electronic blue sheets,
it would be more cost-effective to achieve the SEC’s objectives for this rulemaking through
modifications to OATS).
207. Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 67,457, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,722 (Aug. 1,
2012) [hereinafter Consolidated Audit Trail Release]. The SEC noted in that rulemaking that
certain aspects of the large trader rule could be rendered superfluous by the consolidated audit trail
rule. Id. at 45,734.
208. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,963–64.
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considered the option of obtaining the information it needed from their
home country regulators. 209
3. Economic Consequences
The adopting release states that “the Commission has designed the
proposed [sic] rule to minimize the burdens of the large trader reporting
requirements on both large traders and registered broker-dealers.” 210 The
SEC did make some accommodations in response to concerns about the
rule’s burdens outweighing its benefits. For example, the SEC eliminated
the requirement that large traders report their account numbers in response
to concerns from commenters about the burden and impracticability of
reporting account numbers. 211 More broadly, however, it is unclear that the
SEC did the requisite work to understand those burdens.
The adopting release includes baseline work to estimate the number of
affected large traders and broker-dealers and the burdens, but the basis for
those estimates is uncertain. 212 The SEC acknowledged that broker-dealers
would be required to make certain information technology expenditures to
comply with the rule 213 and estimated that initial implementation efforts
would take firms an aggregate of 133,500 hours at a cost of $106,060 per
broker-dealer. 214 In reaching this estimate, the SEC looked to the number of
new disclosure items—two—rather than to the complex nature of one of the
two new items—transaction execution time. 215 One firm estimated that it
would cost $3–4 million, but the SEC explained, without sufficient
supporting data, that its own lower estimate was an average across firms. 216

209. This option was suggested in a comment letter on the proposed rule. See Letter from Guido
Ravoet, Sec’y Gen., Eur. Banking Fed’n, and Claude-Alain Margelish, Chief Exec. Officer, Swiss
Bankers Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Ravoet &
Margelish Comment Letter], available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-10/s71010-92.pdf.
210. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,982.
211. Id. at 46,974–75 (discussing why the SEC did not adopt the requirement to disclose
account numbers).
212. See id. at 46,985–92 (noting at times that the Commission underestimated the burdens
placed on large traders and broker-dealers).
213. Id. at 46,977.
214. Id. at 46,989–90 & n.320.
215. See, e.g., Letter from Anne L. Vlcek, Managing Dir. and Assoc. Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to
David S. Shillman, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Trading and Mkts., SEC 5 (Mar. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-10/s71010-100.pdf (“Under current market structure,
reporting brokers in many circumstances face overwhelming challenges in obtaining execution
times for large traders because of the complexities that exist in processing and settling trades.”).
216. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,996–97. Perhaps suggesting that the
SEC underestimated the amount of work necessary, subsequent to adoption, the SEC extended the
compliance date for broker-dealers under the rule. Order Temporarily Exempting Broker-Dealers
from the Recordkeeping, Reporting, and Monitoring Requirements of Rule 13h-1 Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Granting an Exemption for Certain Securities Transactions,
Exchange Act Release No. 66,839, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,007 (Apr. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Order
Temporarily Exempting Broker-Dealers Release].
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The SEC’s analysis omitted serious consideration of certain costs. The
rule requires broker-dealers to monitor for unidentified large traders and
affords a safe harbor to broker-dealers that set up policies and procedures
reasonably designed to detect unidentified large traders.217 Thus, even a
broker-dealer that is unlikely to have large trader customers might decide—
out of an abundance of caution—to avail itself of the safe harbor, which
would entail costs that the SEC does not take into account. Also relevant
are downstream costs—the costs that broker-dealers covered by the rule
will impose on traders in order to ensure the covered broker-dealers’
compliance. 218 The SEC attempted to limit the type of information that it
required in order to avoid necessitating requests to other broker-dealers, 219
but it also required broker-dealers to treat customers as large traders if they
have “actual knowledge” that they are. This obligation is likely to inspire
broker-dealers to take protective steps to avoid violating the rule, including
requiring entities with which they interact to put protective measures in
place; indeed, the rule’s safe harbor is premised on strong policies and
procedures. The SEC does not account for the costs of these measures. 220
The SEC likewise may have underestimated the difficulty that parent
companies would have, in light of information barriers, in obtaining
information from subsidiaries. 221 The SEC concluded that if a parent
company found too difficult the task of aggregating information to
determine whether it qualifies as a large trader, the company “may elect to
register voluntarily as a large trader.” 222 Doing so would require the parent
company to obtain even more—albeit different—information from
affiliated entities.
The SEC did not give serious consideration to less easily quantifiable
costs of the rulemaking, such as the possibility that the extensive
information provided by large traders to the SEC could be compromised to
the competitive detriment of the large traders. The SEC promised to
217. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,960–61.
218. See, e.g., Gregory J. Nowak & Matthew R. Silver, Are You a ‘Large Trader’ Subject to the

New SEC Reporting Rules?, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.pepperlaw.com
/publications_update.aspx?ArticleKey=2180 (anticipating that “many hedge fund managers and
similar entities will implement programs to monitor their daily trading levels so as to avoid
tripping the thresholds of the LT Reporting Rule”); The SEC’s New Large Trader Reporting Rule,
SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm
?TrackedFile=4B46116605D7EFD896B179&TrackedFolder=585C1D235281AED9B6A07D5F9
F9478AB5A90188899 (recommending that broker-dealers “[c]onsider whether to modify your
customer agreement and obtain representations from customers regarding large trader status”).
219. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,991–92.
220. Id. at 46,998 n.408 (“To the extent that a broker-dealer that is subject to the monitoring
requirements requires, by contract or otherwise, an entity that is not otherwise subject to the
Rule’s monitoring requirements to nevertheless perform a monitoring function, the Commission’s
estimate does not account for that situation.”).
221. See id. at 46,989 (arguing that firewalls will not be violated by information being shared
by a subsidiary directly with its parent).
222. Id.
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“protect[] the confidentiality of that information to the fullest extent
permitted by applicable law,” 223 but a recent data breach by staff in an SEC
office charged with market monitoring suggests that the possibility of
information being compromised is not so remote. 224 The notice also did not
give much consideration to the rule’s potential to shift trading. The
adopting release remonstrated a commenter for failing to provide data to
support its contention that large traders might shift to securities not covered
by the new regulation in order to avoid its burdens but did not offer data to
support its counter-contention. 225
E. NET WORTH STANDARD FOR ACCREDITED INVESTORS
The Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors rulemaking
implements section 413(a) of Dodd-Frank, which directed the SEC to adjust
the net worth standard for accredited investors under the Securities Act to
exclude the value of an investor’s primary residence. 226 Generally, under
the securities laws, issuers (such as companies, hedge funds, and private
equity funds) are able to offer and sell securities to accredited investors
without triggering costly SEC registration requirements.227 One type of
accredited investor—the one addressed in this rulemaking—is an individual
or couple that qualifies by virtue of having a net worth greater than $1
million. 228 The SEC’s new net worth standard calculation excludes the
value of the primary residence and indebtedness associated with the primary
residence to the extent the indebtedness does not exceed the value of the
house. 229 The rulemaking also includes some related technical amendments.
This rule received a Report Card score of 14 out of 60, which made it
one of the lowest-scoring rules in our sample. The exclusion of the value of
primary residences from the net worth calculation was immediately
effective upon enactment of Dodd-Frank, and the SEC’s rulemaking
reflected that change in its rules without asking more fundamental questions
about the standard. 230 The SEC did not look at the outcomes that standard
223. Id. at 46,976.
224. SEC OFFICE

OF INSPECTOR GEN., NO. OIG-557, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION:
INVESTIGATION INTO MISUSE OF RESOURCES AND VIOLATIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
SECURITY POLICIES WITHIN THE DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS 25–26 (2012), available
at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/oig-557.pdf (finding, among other things, that laptops used by
SEC staff in inspections were left unattended, unencrypted, and unprotected).
225. Large Trader Reporting Release, supra note 76, at 46,982 (citing Ravoet & Margelish
Comment Letter, supra note 209).
226. Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 74.
227. For a brief overview, see Accredited Investors, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers
/accred.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
228. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215(e), .501(a)(5) (2014).
229. See id. §§ 230.215(e)(1), .501(a)(5)(i).
230. Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 74, at 81,793 (noting that the “change to the net
worth standard was effective upon enactment by operation of the Dodd-Frank Act, but it also
requires us to revise our current Securities Act rules to conform to the new standard”).
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was trying to achieve, the problems that stood in the way of achieving them,
or whether there might have been a better way to solve those problems. The
rulemaking analyzed only the costs and benefits of its specific amendments,
such as whether it should grandfather existing investors and whether and to
what degree it should exclude from the net worth calculation mortgage debt
along with the value of the home. 231 Dodd-Frank, however, gave the SEC
leeway—after conducting analysis—to make adjustments to the statutory
definition as it “may deem appropriate for the protection of investors, in the
public interest, and in light of the economy.” 232 The SEC declined to
exercise that authority, 233 but the existence of the authority underscores
congressional interest in understanding the effects of the standard.
Conducting an analysis of the statutory standard would have helped to
elucidate those effects.
1. Systemic Problem
The problem the statutory mandate and the rulemaking were seeking to
address was presumably tied to the fact that the rapid increase in housing
prices before the financial crisis enabled people who had not previously
qualified as accredited investors to meet the accredited investor threshold.
The adopting release does not mention this issue or look at whether the
broadening of the accredited investor category through the increase in home
values resulted in investor harm.
The fact that a new set of individuals generally not previously able to
purchase private securities were able to purchase them because of the
increase in home values provided the SEC with a useful natural experiment.
The SEC could have looked at whether these newly qualified investors took
advantage of their ability to buy securities previously off limits to them and,
if so, whether and how these investors were harmed. It would also have
been useful to look at whether sellers of these securities targeted this newly
qualified group of investors aggressively or, of their own volition, excluded
investors who would have qualified as accredited solely by virtue of their
home equity. These inquiries, which the SEC could have conducted with
the assistance of FINRA and state securities administrators, would have
helped the SEC, Congress, and the public to assess the reasonableness of
limiting access to investments based on wealth. An inquiry of this sort
might also have shed light on the extent to which an investor who has
231. Id. at 81,802–03.
232. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577–78 (2010).

(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012) and 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2014)). This
discretionary provision allows for an “initial review and adjustment” of the term. A separate
provision requires a review of the definition of “accredited investor” “in its entirety” at least every
four years beginning four years from the enactment of Dodd-Frank. Id.
233. Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 74, at 81,795 (explaining the Commission’s
decision to wait until the Government Accountability Office completes a related study before
considering whether to modify the statutory definition).
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become accredited largely because of a rapid increase in home prices is in
need of greater protection than an investor who has become accredited due
to a rapid increase in the price of gold or the value of his stock portfolio.
2. Alternatives
The accredited investor standard, which is primarily rooted in wealth or
income rather than financial sophistication, has long been controversial, as
it excludes most individual investors from a whole set of investments.234 As
a consequence, some have suggested non-wealth-based accredited investor
standards. 235 The SEC could have considered whether shifting to an explicit
financial sophistication standard or an investment diversification
requirement would be a better way to protect investors. The SEC already
uses the financial sophistication of the buyer or his representative as a
criterion under Rule 506, which permits securities to be sold to a small
number of certain non-accredited investors.236 Alternatively, the SEC could
have considered whether the existing FINRA suitability rule, pursuant to
which broker-dealer representatives selling securities must make only
suitable recommendations to their customers, was sufficient to protect
investors or whether it could be amended to require heightened care when
the bulk of an investor’s wealth was made up of home equity. 237 The SEC
did consider the suitability rule in determining whether to require mortgage
debt to be included if the proceeds were used to purchase securities. 238 The
SEC also did not consider whether additional provisions of Dodd-Frank that
require private fund advisers to register with the SEC and be subject to SEC

234. See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund
Market for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 308 (2008) (discussing
problems with wealth as proxy for financial sophistication in the hedge fund context).
235. See, e.g., Wallace K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s
“Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 760 (2009)
(recommending supplementing wealth standard with a licensing examination for investors); SoYeon Lee, Note, Why the “Accredited Investor” Standard Fails the Average Investor, 31 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 987, 1011 (2012) (arguing that “criteria for evaluating whether a particular
investor can afford to take risks should be based on whether the investor has discretionary income,
not on whether he or she is worth an arbitrary amount of money, or makes some arbitrary amount
of income”).
236. Under Rule 506, an offering is not treated as a public offering if it is sold to no more than
thirty-five purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (“Each purchaser who is not an accredited
investor either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale
that such purchaser comes within this description.”).
237. Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638 (retired NASD Rule 2310). FINRA
subsequently replaced the rule with FINRA Rule 2111. See FINRA, FINRA MANUAL: OFFICIAL
PUBLICATION OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY (2013), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8469.
238. Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 74, at 81,800 & n.65.
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examination 239 may have made adjustments to the net worth standard
unnecessary.
3. Economic Consequences
The SEC’s analysis of the economic consequences of the rulemaking
was limited to the clarifications that it made. The SEC asserted that its
clarifying rules promote efficiency and reduce the cost of raising capital. 240
It also noted that its approach expanded the pool of potential purchasers and
thus lowered costs to issuers by allowing for the exclusion from the
calculation of mortgage debt along with the value of the home. 241 The SEC
looked at the difference between excluding all mortgage debt and excluding
only the debt up to the value of the home and found that there was “no
material difference” in the number of affected households. 242 The SEC
could have used the same data source—the Federal Reserve Board Survey
of Consumer Finances—to look more broadly at the question of how many
fewer households would qualify under the new net worth standard. It could
have used that information to consider whether issuers would face
heightened costs as a result of the decreased pool of investors.
F. REPORTING BY INVESTMENT ADVISERS ON FORM PF
In a joint rulemaking, the SEC and the CFTC adopted rules under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Commodity Exchange Act that
would require SEC-registered investment advisers managing $150 million
or more in private fund assets to file a new form with the SEC —Form
PF—to provide information to regulators about the adviser and its private
fund clients. 243 Form PF collects detailed information about the funds’ types
of investments, owners, and counterparties.244 Form PF comprises four
sections, the first of which must be completed by any SEC-registered
adviser that manages one or more private funds and has—together with its
related persons—at least $150 million in assets under management. 245
Section 2 must be completed by large hedge fund advisers, meaning those
with at least $1.5 billion in hedge fund assets under management. 246 Section
239. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b), 80b-4 (2012).
240. See Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 74, at 81,803.
241. Id. at 81,801 (“The amendments will result in a larger pool of accredited investors than the

first alternative method of implementation, under which all indebtedness secured by the primary
residence would be included as a liability in the net worth calculation.”).
242. Id. at 81,801 & n.72.
243. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75. Certain parts of the rulemaking
pertain only to the SEC. Each agency performed its own economic analysis. We omit
consideration of the CFTC’s analysis from the discussion below.
244. See id. at 71,176–228.
245. See id. at 71,177–78 (describing in Instruction 3 which advisers have to complete which
parts of Form PF).
246. See id.
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3 must be completed by large liquidity fund advisers, meaning those with at
least $1 billion in money market and liquidity fund assets under
management. 247 The fourth section must be completed by large private
equity fund advisers, meaning those with at least $2 billion in private equity
fund assets under management. 248 Large hedge fund and liquidity fund
advisers are required to update Form PF quarterly, and smaller advisers and
private equity fund advisers must file annually. 249
Form PF responds to a Dodd-Frank provision that authorizes the SEC
to collect information from investment advisers to private funds “as
necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of
investors, or for the assessment of systemic risk by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC),” 250 and it directs the SEC and the CFTC to
conduct a rulemaking. 251 Form PF is intended to “provide FSOC and the
Commissions with important information about the basic operations and
strategies of private funds and help establish a baseline picture of potential
systemic risk in the private fund industry.” 252 In addition, the CFTC and
SEC anticipate that Form PF will provide them with the information they
need to devise further regulations for, and better target examinations of,
private funds. 253
As the notice explains, FSOC is “at the center of a framework”
designed to prevent another costly financial crisis, and Form PF’s primary
purpose is to help to ensure FSOC has adequate information to carry out its
mission. 254 Dodd-Frank charged FSOC, a multi-regulator council that
includes the chairmen of the SEC and CFTC, with “identify[ing] risks to the
financial stability of the United States.” 255 Among FSOC’s responsibilities
is the designation for additional regulatory supervision of nonbank financial
companies that could pose risks to the financial system. 256 Nonbank
financial companies include private funds.257
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 71,181–82 (describing in Instruction 9 when advisers must update Form PF).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(1)(A) (2012).
Id. § 80b-11.
Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,128–29.
Id. at 71,166.
Id. at 71,164.
12 U.S.C. § 5322(a). FSOC’s voting members are the Secretary of Treasury, the Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Director of the CFPB, the Chairman of the SEC, the Chairman of the CFTC, the Chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Administration, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and an
independent insurance expert. Id. § 5321(b)(1).
256. Id. § 5323 (authorizing FSOC to designate any financial company that through “material
financial distress” or “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix” of
its activities “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States”).
257. FSOC Issues Final Rule on ‘Systemically Significant’ Nonbank Financial Companies,
ROTHSTEIN KASS, 1 (May 2012), http://www.rkco.com/getattachment/a7b9592c-210b-4358-b2cb-
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Performing the analysis for a rule that is primarily designed to serve
another agency is a difficult task, and the Report Card score for this
rulemaking—18 out of 60—reflects this difficulty. As the following excerpt
from the notice suggests, the rule seems primarily a response to the
perceived needs of FSOC rather than a solution to a clearly identified
problem:
The policy judgments implicit in the information required to be reported
on Form PF reflect FSOC’s role as the primary user of the reported
information for the purpose of monitoring systemic risk. The SEC would
not necessarily have required the same scope of reporting if the
information reported on Form PF were intended solely for the SEC’s use.
We expect the information collected on Form PF and provided to FSOC
will be an important part of FSOC’s systemic risk monitoring in the
private fund industry . . . . In its most recent release on this subject, FSOC
confirmed that the information reported on Form PF is important not only
to conducting an assessment of systemic risk among private fund advisers
258
but also to determining how that assessment should be made.

In explaining why particular decisions were made, the notice of final
rulemaking repeatedly refers to “our staffs’ consultations with the staff
representing the members of FSOC.” 259 FSOC relies largely on staff drawn
from the agencies that FSOC members head, presumably including staff of
the SEC and CFTC. 260 Because the nature of the staff-level conversations is
typically not discussed in any detail, the rationale for the collection of
particular types of information remains unclear.
1. Systemic Problem
The notice does not clearly identify a systemic problem that the rule is
intended to solve. Rather, while acknowledging Congress’s recognition that
private funds are not generally believed to have played a major role in the
5326d44ad368/FSOC-Issues-Final-Rule-on-Systemically-Significant (explaining that “both fund
managers and their private funds generally fall within the definition of a nonbank financial
company”).
258. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,129–30 (footnotes
omitted).
259. See, e.g., id. at 71,129; see also id. at 71,131 n.243 (“[B]ased on our consultation with staff
representing FSOC’s members, we believe that turnover will provide important insight into the
role of hedge funds in providing trading liquidity in certain markets.”).
260. See Frequently Asked Questions, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2014)
(Response to “How does FSOC operate?”: “The Council operates under a committee structure to
promote shared responsibility among the member agencies and to leverage the expertise that
already exists at each agency . . . . The Council also maintains a small, independent staff to
provide advice on statutory authorities and obligations, and to manage its document flow, records
retention, and public records disclosure. This staff also includes policy experts to help coordinate
the work of the committees and, where appropriate, complex inter-agency rule makings, to
support Council functions such as designations, and to draft reports to Congress.”).
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last financial crisis, it points out that having data about private funds could
be useful in the next crisis. 261 To the extent that systemic risk is the problem
driving the rule, the SEC acknowledges that Form PF is not, in and of itself,
an antidote to systemic risk. 262
Elsewhere, the notice suggests that the rule might be aimed at solving
other problems—excessive risk-taking by hedge funds that imposes
negative externalities and improper capital allocation. 263 The SEC seems to
anticipate that Form PF may help to curb socially harmful risk-taking by
imposing costs in a way that will force firms to internalize the costs of that
risk-taking. 264 In citing as a potential benefit of the rule the allocation of
“capital to investments with a higher value to the economy as a whole”
flowing from improved risk management, 265 the SEC seems to be
identifying improper allocation of capital as a problem. The SEC does not
provide the information necessary to demonstrate that hedge fund risktaking is imposing externalities, that hedge funds are misallocating capital,
or that Form PF is the appropriate solution to those problems.
The analysis of the underlying problem should have distinguished
among different types of funds. Private equity funds, for example, are very
different from hedge funds and do not pose the same types of risks. 266
Although the “SEC acknowledges that several potentially mitigating factors
suggest that private equity funds may have less potential to pose systemic
risk than some other types of private funds,” it goes on to state that such
differences are not relevant because
[t]he design of Form PF . . . is not intended to reflect a determination as to
where systemic risk exists but rather to provide empirical data to FSOC

261. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,164 (citing S. REP. NO.
111–176, at 38 (2010)).
262. Id. at 71,165 (citing FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT ii
(2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf)
(noting that “although collecting information on Form PF will increase the transparency of the
private fund industry to regulators (an important prerequisite to understanding and monitoring
systemic risk), transparency alone may not be sufficient to address systemic risk”).
263. Id. at 71,116 (explaining that private fund investors and advisers stand to benefit from
better risk management as a result of Form PF).
264. Id. at 71,171 (“[T]he uneven distribution of the benefits and costs of Form PF reflects the
potential for an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of engaging in risky financial
activities that may impose negative externalities . . . .”).
265. Id. at 71,166 (“The SEC believes that private fund advisers may, as a result, assess more
carefully the risks associated with particular investments and, in the aggregate, allocate capital to
investments with a higher value to the economy as a whole.”).
266. See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG.
L. REV. 559, 585 (2011) (arguing that private equity funds were being treated like hedge funds for
European regulatory purposes although “the business models (and systemic risk implications) of
private equity and hedge funds are quite distinct”).
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with which it may make a determination about the extent to which the
267
activities of private equity funds or their advisers pose such risk.

2. Alternatives
The notice identified five alternatives that were considered, but these
reflected variations on the same regulatory approach rather than distinct
alternatives. 268 More distinct approaches exist and could have been
considered. For example, if private funds’ interactions with other financial
institutions are the area of greatest concern, then obtaining information
from private funds’ counterparties—many of which already provide a lot of
information to the government—about their exposure to private funds could
provide regulators with more relevant information at a lower cost. As others
have suggested, an alternative approach could rely on private monitoring
through hedge funds’ prime brokers—typically large, heavily regulated
financial institutions:
There is, however, an alternative mechanism for using private information
about hedge fund positions for the purpose of measuring systemic risk, i.e.
via prime brokers. They observe the whole trading activity of client hedge
funds, and often run its risk engines. Given their involvement in
counterparty risk, they have a strong incentive to monitor fund exposures
closely. Such continuous monitoring can provide early warning signs for
systemic risk. While this is essentially a market solution, supervisors, who
already regulate the prime brokers, could require that prime brokers fulfill
269
such a function.

267. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,153 (citing Eilís Ferran,
The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Case Study in the Development of the EU’s
Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
176, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762119 (supporting the proposition that one
need not limit remedial measures taken in response to a crisis to the areas that caused the last
crisis)). While that is correct, the SEC still needs to identify the problem it is trying to solve in
order to determine how to solve it.
268. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,163 (“Among the
alternatives that we considered were requirements that varied along the following five dimensions:
(1) Requiring more or less information; (2) requiring more or fewer advisers to complete the
Form; (3) allowing advisers to rely more on their existing methodologies and recordkeeping
practices in completing the Form (or, alternatively, requiring more standardized responses); (4)
requiring more or less frequent reporting; and (5) allowing advisers more or less time to complete
and file the Form.”).
269. See, e.g., Jón Daníelsson et al., Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds Be
Regulated; A Survey, 1 J. FIN. STABILITY 522, 537 (2005) (discussing benefits and costs of
different approaches to hedge fund regulation); see also Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge
Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN.
STABILITY 283, 296 (2000) (pointing to the effectiveness of “[i]ndirect regulation by prime
brokers and market discipline by creditors, counterparties, and investors” and arguing “that direct
regulation of hedge funds may not be feasible and is not likely to be effective, due to the delays
with reporting and processing the information”).
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The SEC also could have looked at other possible avenues for obtaining
data. One option would be to expand the existing investment adviser
registration form, Form ADV, to capture additional information about
private funds. This alternative would have required protection of
confidential information, since Form ADV is publicly available but would
have streamlined advisers’ reporting obligations. Alternatively, the SEC
could have considered whether the Office of Financial Research, a new
Dodd-Frank agency established to collect data on behalf of FSOC, 270 would
be better suited to collect information relevant to assessing systemic risk of
private funds.
3. Economic Consequences
The rule’s benefits are described in sweeping, imprecise terms. For
example, the economic analysis section explained that “if this information
helps to avoid even a small portion of the costs of a financial crisis like the
most recent one, the benefits of Form PF will be very significant.” 271 A
more precise linkage of the information being collected to its usefulness in
minimizing the costs of a financial crisis would have been more helpful to
the commissions as they decided what information to collect.
The discussions of direct costs are likewise too imprecise to be of use in
Commission decision-making. For example, the notice acknowledges that
“particular advisers may, based on their circumstances, incur burdens
substantially greater than or less than the estimated averages” but
anticipates with imprecision that “the average burden of completing Form
PF is very unlikely to be in the thousands or tens of thousands of hours.” 272
Similarly, the SEC’s estimates for hardware costs were imprecise, ranging
from an aggregate industry cost of “$0 to $25,000,000 for the first year,
though the actual cost is likely to fall in between these two end-points.” 273
The economic analysis section states that the SEC made many changes
to the original proposal intended to reduce cost burdens, in response to
comments claiming that the estimated cost burdens in the proposal were too
low. These include extending compliance dates, allowing some firms to
report annually rather than quarterly, increasing size thresholds for firms
that need to file, and allowing advisers to use existing data tracking
methodologies to a greater extent.274 It seems clear that these changes were
made in response to comments, not because of anything the commissions
learned from the benefit-cost analysis, and the analysis was then updated to
reflect the revised regulation.
270. 12 U.S.C. § 5343(a)(1) (2012) (describing the role of the Office of Financial Research in
supporting FSOC by, among other things, “collecting data on behalf of the Council”).
271. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,166.
272. Id. at 71,159 n.395.
273. Id. at 71,163.
274. Id.
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In some cases, the SEC concluded that FSOC’s perceived information
needs obviated the need to estimate costs. For example, in considering
whether to require a fair value breakdown of assets and liabilities, the SEC
concluded that advisers that do not already prepare such a breakdown may
“incur additional costs to complete this question, and we are sensitive to
their costs. We believe, however, that this question will provide valuable
information for FSOC’s systemic risk monitoring activities and our investor
protection mission and that the associated burden is warranted.” 275
Similarly, with regard to a requirement that certain data be reported on a
monthly basis, the notice concludes:
Based on our staffs’ consultations with staff representing FSOC’s
members, we agree with commenters who argued that rapidly changing
markets and portfolios merit collecting certain information more often
than on a quarterly basis, and we are not persuaded that the large hedge
fund and large liquidity fund advisers required to respond to these
276
questions will be overwhelmed by this reporting.

In order to fully understand the consequences of the rule, the economic
analysis should have included more than cursory consideration of indirect
costs. For example, the notice does not take adequate account of potential
indirect costs of having the government collect information about private
funds. One potential cost is a decrease in private monitoring because of the
market’s reliance on increased government monitoring. 277 Less monitoring
by private fund investors and counterparties could lead to heightened risktaking. Decreased private sector monitoring might not be offset by
government monitoring, particularly if the government is unable to use the
information it collects effectively.
The SEC should have considered the cost to the government of
processing and effectively using detailed information about private funds.

275. Id. at 71,145 (omitting a footnote that cited to the need for FSOC to understand “the extent
to which the fund’s value is determined using metrics other than market mechanisms”).
276. Id. at 71,151.
277. See, e.g., Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge Funds and
Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20060516a.htm (“As a practical matter, could the authorities collect such an enormous
quantity of highly sensitive information in sufficient detail and with sufficient frequency (daily, at
least) to be effectively informed about liquidity risk in particular market segments . . . ? Perhaps
most important, would counterparties relax their vigilance if they thought the authorities were
monitoring and constraining hedge funds’ risk-taking?”); see also Houman B. Shadab, Hedge
Funds and the Financial Crisis, MERCATUS ON POL’Y, Jan. 2009, at 3, available at
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/RSP_MOP34_Hedge_Funds_and_the_Financial
_Crisis.pdf (“Moreover, additional government oversight may increase complacency, undermine
ongoing private efforts to improve best practices, and overwhelm regulators with duties beyond
their resources and abilities.”).
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Some have suggested that academics could help analyze the information,278
but confidentiality restrictions make it difficult to share information with
academics. Including unnecessary items on Form PF could distract FSOC
from information that would be more relevant to systemic risk assessments.
The SEC acknowledged that information overload was a possibility when it
explained, in connection with a decision to separate data by fund strategy,
that excluding “extraneous information” would enhance the utility of the
information for FSOC, the SEC, and the CFTC. 279 This concern, however,
seems not to have informed the rest of the analysis, which is infused with a
more-is-better approach to information collection rather than a careful
consideration of whether collecting particular information would be
helpful. 280 As one example of information that might not be useful, Form
PF requires data about funds that do not pose a systemic risk. 281
Although the SEC acknowledged the importance of protecting the
information submitted and discussed possible ways that it would do so, 282
potential compromises to the confidentiality of private adviser information
were not considered as a potential cost. No matter how carefully the SEC’s
policies are crafted, there is likely to be a security breach at some point by
staff or computer systems at the SEC, CFTC, FSOC, FINRA (which
administers the Form PF filing system), or one of the other regulators to
which Form PF information is provided. 283 Accordingly, this cost should
have been taken into account. The SEC also did not undertake to determine
whether the rule would reduce hedge fund activities and their attendant
278. Leonard Nakamura, Durable Financial Regulation: Monitoring Financial Instruments as a
Counterpart to Regulating Financial Institutions 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 17006, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17006.pdf (“To the extent
consistent with privacy considerations, permitting academics and investment advisors to access
and analyze the financial database would enhance the capacity to identify cyclic and systemic
risks within the U.S. financial structure.”).
279. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,134.
280. See, e.g, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A
PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM ES-13 (2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org
/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf (“[T]he regulator would bear the burden of
demonstrating its need for the required information as well as its ability to use that information
effectively.”); Anne Rivière, The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach, 10
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 326 (2011) (arguing that the burden of proof should be on
regulators to show that required data “is necessary to assess systemic risk”).
281. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,137 (explaining that
“FSOC would benefit from access to data about funds that, on an individual basis, may not be a
source of systemic risk”).
282. Id. at 71,156.
283. See, e.g., SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: INVESTIGATION
INTO MISUSE OF RESOURCES AND VIOLATIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
POLICIES WITHIN THE DIVISION OF TRADING AND MARKETS (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/oig-557.pdf (discussing the unprotected status of certain SEC
computers); see also Peter Schroeder, Staff Data Leaks out of the SEC, HILL (July 25, 2013),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/313387-staff-data-leaks-out-of-the-sec
(discussing
how personally identifiable information of SEC staff was transferred unwittingly to an employee’s
thumb drive and then to the servers of another government agency).
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positive externalities.284 The SEC reasoned that performance fees are high
enough relative to Form PF costs to ensure that private advisers will not
shut private funds down or attempt to keep them below registration
thresholds in response to the compliance costs.285 The SEC further opined
that a private adviser that turned investors away would hurt its reputation
with investors, 286 but hedge funds routinely turn away investors.287 To
better assess how additional costs would affect the size and number of
private funds and returns to private fund advisers, the SEC would have to
consider factors such as how competitive the private fund market is. A
better understanding of the competitive landscape would have helped the
commissions to anticipate whether Form PF would affect hedge fund
investment levels.
G. RULES IMPLEMENTING AMENDMENTS TO THE INVESTMENT
ADVISERS ACT OF 1940
Pursuant to authority granted in Dodd-Frank, the SEC adopted new
rules and amendments under the Advisers Act.288 First, the rulemaking
shifts a group of smaller, SEC-registered investment advisers—those with
between $25 million and $100 million—to state registration.289 Second, the
rulemaking eliminates certain private fund adviser exemptions from
registration and reporting requirements. 290 Third, the rulemaking requires
284. See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, REGULATION,
Spring 2007, at 36 (“Academics, industry professionals, and regulatory authorities
overwhelmingly agree that hedge funds benefit the economy by mitigating price downturns,
bearing risks that others will not, making securities more liquid, and ferreting out inefficiencies.”).
Additional regulation, even disclosure regulation, will undermine hedge funds’ traditional
“latitude and flexibility with respect to investment strategies” that derives from their relative lack
of regulation. Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and
Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833, 870 (1999). The SEC did acknowledge that “to the extent that capital
available for investment is reduced, the companies in which private funds would otherwise invest
may also bear costs.” Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,171.
285. Reporting by Investment Advisers Release, supra note 75, at 71,170 (noting that the
agency “believes, however, that substantial economic incentives will likely counter such behavior,
including private fund performance fees that incentivize the private fund adviser to continue
advising its funds and maximize fund appreciation and return”).
286. Id. (“[W]e anticipate that business relations with investors that may be damaged if the
adviser turns away investor assets may also motivate advisers to continue to permit the size of
their funds to increase as a result of new investment . . . .”).
287. Bernard Madoff reportedly enhanced his reputation as a money manager by turning
investors away. See, e.g., The Madoff Affair: Con of the Century, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2008, at
119, available at http://www.economist.com/node/12818310 (“Turning away some investors and
telling those he accepted not to talk to outsiders produced a sense of exclusivity.”). Although
hindsight shows us that Madoff was perpetrating a fraud, the ease with which he attracted investor
money suggests that turning potential investors away can bolster an adviser’s reputation.
288. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75.
289. Id. at 42,951–61 (discussing the transition of mid-sized advisers from SEC to state
registration).
290. Id. at 42,961–65 (discussing exempt reporting advisers); id. at 42,975 (discussing the
narrowing of private adviser exemption).
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private fund advisers that are exempt from registration—“exempt reporting
advisers”—to fulfill certain reporting requirements.291 Finally, the
rulemaking applies the SEC’s pay-to-play rules to exempt reporting
advisers and foreign private advisers and makes a number of technical
amendments. 292
This rule received a Report Card score of 14 out of 60, which made it
one of the lowest-scoring rules in our sample. The SEC’s analysis suffered
from a lack of precision with respect to objectives and an absence of critical
assessment of potential consequences of the rulemaking. Rather than
identifying problems, the SEC relied on Dodd-Frank mandates to justify the
key pieces of the rulemaking 293 and did not conduct related analysis. 294
Even the SEC’s decisions that extended beyond the clear statutory
mandates were supported only with general references to enhancing the
SEC’s knowledge base. 295 The SEC considered commenters’ suggestions
about particular registration and reporting items and made some changes in
response 296 but did not carefully consider the implications for the SEC,
291. Dodd-Frank exempted venture capital fund advisers and private fund advisers with less
than $150 million in U.S. assets under management from registration but permitted the SEC to
impose reporting and recordkeeping requirements on them “as the Commission deems necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 407, 408, 124 Stat. 1376, 1574–75 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l),
(m) (2012)) (adding Adviser Act subsections 203(l) and (m), respectively). Traditionally,
unregistered advisers have not been subject to extensive reporting requirements, but the SEC
imposed substantial reporting requirements in this rulemaking. See Jeff Schwartz, The
Crystallization of Hedge Fund Regulation, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 77 (2011),
http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Schwartz-HedgeFundReg.pdf (arguing that
“[t]he requirements for exempt advisers is likely the area where the SEC pushed its authority the
furthest”).
292. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,974–75 (discussing payto-play amendments).
293. Dodd-Frank Act § 410 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3A(a)(2)) (adding new
section 203A(a)(2) of the Advisers Act to move mid-sized advisers—those required to register
with and that are subject to examination by their home states, and that have $25–100 million in
assets under management (or whatever higher threshold the SEC chooses)—to state registration
from SEC registration); Dodd-Frank Act § 403 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b))
(amending section 203(b) of the Advisers Act by eliminating private adviser exemption from
registration); Dodd-Frank Act §§ 407, 408 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(l), (m))
(amending section 203 of the Advisers Act by exempting venture capital fund advisers and small
private fund advisers from registration but authorizing the SEC to impose reporting requirements).
294. See, e.g., Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,977 (explaining
that “[b]ecause many of the new rules and rule amendments will implement or clarify provisions
of the Dodd-Frank Act, they will not create benefits and costs separate from the benefits and costs
considered by Congress in passing the Dodd-Frank Act,” and limiting consideration of costs and
benefits to those not generated by Dodd-Frank).
295. See, e.g., id. at 42,983 (explaining that Form ADV “changes will give us a more complete
picture of an adviser’s practices, help us better understand an adviser’s operations, business and
services, and provide us with more information to determine an adviser’s risk profile and prepare
for examinations”).
296. See, e.g., id. at 42,958 (“We are persuaded by these comments that a buffer may prevent
costs and disruption to advisers that otherwise may have to switch between federal and state
registration frequently because of, for example, the volatility of the market values of the assets
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investors, and the market of adding substantial numbers of registered and
reporting private fund advisers to the SEC’s ranks and moving smaller
advisers to state oversight.
1. Systemic Problem
The SEC did not identify the problems this rulemaking is intended to
solve. One potential problem that could lead to the decision to shift
investment advisers to state oversight is the increase in the number of
investment advisers registered with the SEC297 and the Commission’s
struggle to properly oversee such a large number of firms. 298 However,
another part of the rulemaking—the new registration and reporting schemes
for private fund advisers that were previously exempt—would exacerbate
the SEC’s oversight burden, particularly because these advisers are more
complex than the smallest advisers. 299
A thorough assessment of the problems underlying the rulemaking
would have been particularly helpful given that the rulemaking marks a
substantial shift of emphasis for the SEC away from the protection of retail
investors and towards the protection of private fund investors. Access to
hedge funds and other private funds is limited to investors who meet certain
wealth thresholds—thresholds that were increased by Dodd-Frank. 300 These
accreditation requirements are intended to restrict private funds to investors
who are adequately sophisticated or able to afford knowledgeable advisers
to find suitable funds for them. 301 Moreover, these investors are presumed
they manage.”); id. at 42,937 (deciding, based on adverse comment, not to “accelerate the
deadline for filing an annual updating amendment to an adviser’s Form ADV filing”).
297. See, e.g., SEC STAFF OF DIV. OF INV. MGMT., STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT
ADVISER EXAMINATIONS para. II.A (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011
/914studyfinal.pdf (reporting that between October 1, 2004, and September 30, 2010, the number
of registered investment advisers increased 38.5%, from 8581 to 11,888 advisers). It is surprising
that the SEC does not appear to have employed the findings of this study in its analysis.
298. See, e.g., SEC, FY 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND FY 2012 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 29 (2013) [hereinafter FY
2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN], available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf (finding that in fiscal year 2010, the
SEC examined only nine percent of registered investment advisers.).
299. See, e.g., Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Statement on Study Enhancing Investment
Adviser Examinations (Required by Section 914 of Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act) (Jan. 2011), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/2011/spch011911ebw.pdf (“Importantly, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act, while there will be a
near-term decrease in the number of registered investment advisers under the Commission’s
jurisdiction, the staff estimates that net assets under management will increase immediately as
larger and more complex entities enter the Commission’s oversight.”).
300. See supra Part IV.E (discussing these changes).
301. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing Definition of an
Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 683 (2008) (“Very generally, an accredited investor is
an investor who is sufficiently sophisticated so as not to need the protections of the federal
securities laws, but such an investor generally is defined in terms of wealth, on the theory that an
accredited investor can hire knowledgeable and sophisticated advisors.”).
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to be able to bear investment losses. 302 Accordingly, the SEC has
traditionally played a less active investor protection role in the private fund
area. 303 Instead it has allocated its resources to the protection of less
wealthy retail investors. 304 As discussed above, concerns have been
expressed about the use of wealth as a measure of financial
sophistication. 305 The SEC could have included consideration of these
concerns in its assessment of the problem the rulemaking was intended to
solve.
With respect to the portion of the rulemaking that requires increased
public disclosures by private fund advisers, the underlying problem is not
obvious. Prospective private fund investors typically demand information
from private fund advisers or enlist the assistance of a third party to obtain
information for them. 306 The SEC did not identify the barriers that were
preventing investors from obtaining the information directly from advisers,
as one would expect investors to be able to do in a competitive market.
Indeed, the SEC acknowledges that the information required by this
rulemaking “is similar to, and at times less extensive than, the information
that investors in hedge funds and other private funds commonly receive in
response to due diligence questionnaires or in offering documents.” 307
The SEC hinted that the problem could be the unreliability of the
information investors are getting when it noted that “it is precisely the
ability of these [sophisticated] investors to compare Form ADV information
to the information they have received in offering documents and due
diligence that makes public disclosure valuable.” 308 The SEC did not

302. See, e.g., Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 74, at 81,794 (explaining that “[o]ne
purpose of the accredited investor concept is to identify persons who can bear the economic risk
of an investment in unregistered securities, including the ability to hold unregistered (and
therefore less liquid) securities for an indefinite period and, if necessary, to afford a complete loss
of such investment”) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 81,794 n.17.
303. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 990 (noting that “the SEC
traditionally has not stepped in to protect the kinds of wealthy investors and institutions who
typically invest in hedge funds. Instead, the SEC has deferred to such well-heeled investors to
protect themselves through market discipline.”).
304. Paul S. Atkins, Protecting Investors Through Hedge Fund Advisor Registration, 25 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 537, 551–52 (2006) (explaining that mandatory hedge fund registration
requirement would shift resources from protecting retail to protecting wealthy investors).
305. See Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,969; Karmel, supra
note 301, at 683.
306. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 303, at 992–93 (discussing due diligence by hedge fund
investors).
307. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,969.
308. Id. at 42,969, 42,964 (“[I]nvestors will be able to compare Form ADV information to the
information they receive in offering documents and due diligence to identify potential
misrepresentations.”); see also id. at 42,963 (arguing that limiting the required information to
“basic identifying data . . . would deny investors an opportunity to verify disclosures they receive
directly from the adviser”).
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provide evidence, however, to support the proposition that inaccurate
information is a significant problem.
2. Alternatives
The SEC did not analyze reasonable alternatives to the different
components of the rule. In a separate Dodd-Frank rulemaking, which was
discussed above, the SEC adopted Form PF, a form designed to provide
information to FSOC, the SEC, and the CFTC about private funds. 309 As
discussed in connection with that rulemaking, disclosure on Form ADV
could serve as an alternative to disclosure on Form PF and vice versa. 310
The SEC also should have considered the degree to which the disclosure
was unnecessary because it was already required elsewhere.311 Rather than
dismissing concerns about reporting that was duplicative with Form D
reporting under the Securities Act, the SEC could have considered whether
expanded Form D reporting could serve as an alternative to the rule’s Form
ADV disclosure. 312
The notice explains that reporting by exempt reporting advisers could
be useful in determining “whether these advisers or their activities might
present sufficient concerns to warrant our further attention” for investor
protection reasons.313 As an alternative way to achieve that objective, the
SEC could have considered relying on tips generated by the new DoddFrank whistleblower program. The whistleblower program could also be
another route for addressing concerns about misinformation being provided
to private fund investors.
To the extent adequate information is not being provided, the SEC
could have considered working with the industry on a voluntary effort to
309. See supra Part IV.G. As discussed in that section, some of the Form PF information might
have been collected better on Form ADV. The decision about which information should be
publicly disclosed (Form ADV) versus disclosed only to regulators (Form PF) turns on its
business sensitivity and usefulness to the general public.
310. The SEC acknowledged the connection when it stated that it considered comments made in
connection with this rulemaking in the Form PF rulemaking. See, e.g., Rules Implementing
Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,967 (“We have considered these comments in the
context of this rulemaking and have determined to make several changes. We will also consider
these comments in the context of the Form PF release.”).
311. Even within Form ADV there is duplicative reporting. Compare id. at 42,965
(acknowledging “the new information requirements we proposed to Part 1A of Form ADV
overlap in some respects with the new brochure requirements” (Part 2 of Form ADV), but noting
“that the overlap may be necessary as the two parts of Form ADV serve very different purposes”),
with id. at 42,968 (noting elsewhere in Form ADV that “[b]y requiring [information about
auditors] in question 23 [of Form ADV], we are able to relieve advisers from the burden of
reporting similar information”).
312. The SEC was “not persuaded that providing this [duplicative] information will
significantly increase the reporting burden, and the information will assist both the Commission
and the public in quickly and accurately locating additional relevant information regarding the
fund.” Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,966 n.230.
313. Id. at 42,962.
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establish best practices for disclosure to investors and potential investors.314
To the extent the SEC wanted to encourage more public disclosures, it
could have considered lifting its own prohibition on advertising—a change
that Congress later directed the SEC to make under the JOBS Act.315
3. Economic Consequences
The SEC should have broadened its consideration of the economic
consequences beyond direct compliance costs. For example, the SEC could
have considered whether the shift in resource allocation from retail funds to
private funds would prompt sophisticated investors to rely excessively on
SEC oversight instead of doing their own homework. If SEC registration is
perceived to be a seal of government approval on an adviser or a fund,
investors may curtail their due diligence. The SEC noted that “clients and
investors may have greater confidence in advisers that provide more
fulsome disclosure and are subject to our oversight.” 316 Given that the SEC
examined only nine percent of registered investment advisers in fiscal year
2010, such confidence may be misplaced.317
The SEC should also have taken into account the role that private funds
play in the market, the economy and investors’ portfolios, as well as the
effect that the rulemaking would have on those roles. The Commission
should have looked at the degree to which private funds contribute to
market liquidity318 and capital formation. 319 Imposing additional costs on
314. The Managed Funds Association, for example, publishes a model due diligence
questionnaire for hedge fund investors. See Model Due Diligence Questionnaire for Hedge Fund
Investors, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, http://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06
/Due-Dilligence-Questionnaire.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
315. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313–15
(2012); see also Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release
No. 69,959, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3624, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 24, 2013).
316. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,993.
317. See FY 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
PLAN supra note 298, at 29.
318. See, e.g., Darwin Choi et al., Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Liquidity Externalities, and
Bond Prices, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 227 (2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr
/Choi_Getmansky_Tookes.pdf (finding that arbitrage in the convertible bond market, in which
hedge funds are actively engaged, enhances liquidity in the underlying equity markets); Petri Jylhä
et al., Do Hedge Funds Supply or Demand Liquidity?, 18 REV. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
13), available at http://efmaefm.org/0EFMSYMPOSIUM/Toronto-2011/papers/Rinne.pdf
(finding “that hedge funds seem to supply liquidity when markets are illiquid and use liquidity
when the markets are liquid so the cost of using liquidity is low”); George Aragon & Philip
Strahan, Hedge Funds as Liquidity Providers: Evidence from Lehman Bankruptcy (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15336 (2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers
/w15336.pdf (concluding, based on evidence from the Lehman bankruptcy, that hedge funds act as
liquidity providers).
319. See, e.g., David J. Brophy et al., Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort?, 22 REV. FIN
STUD. 541, 569 (2006) (finding that companies “that obtain equity financing from hedge funds
tend to be smaller and riskier and are less likely to have analyst coverage compared to firms that
obtain financing from other investor classes”).
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advisers to these funds could materially affect these roles. The SEC also
should have looked at whether the rulemaking might cause advisers to
relocate outside of the United States and refuse U.S. investors. As a
corollary, the SEC could have looked at whether limiting the number of
private fund opportunities available to U.S. investors would hamper their
ability to deploy their money effectively. 320
The SEC did not fully consider the economic consequences of its
mandatory disclosures. There are potential competitive implications of
public disclosure. 321 The SEC gave only brief consideration to these
concerns in response to commenters, who “did not persuade” the SEC that
it could make the requisite finding to overcome the public disclosure
presumption for reports filed with the SEC. 322 More generally, the SEC
could have considered the extensive literature discussing the costs and
benefits of mandatory disclosure. 323
The SEC should have given greater consideration to the implications of
its reporting requirements for exempt reporting advisers. Without a clear
basis, the SEC concludes that although “difficult to quantify,” the benefits
of the exempt reporting adviser reporting requirements “are substantial.” 324
320. There is literature analyzing whether hedge funds outperform mutual funds and the market
more generally. See, e.g., Ackermann et al., supra note 284, at 854–55 (concluding that even
though hedge funds do not outperform market indices on a risk-adjusted basis, “the low beta
values on hedge funds make them a potentially valuable addition to many investors’ portfolios”).
321. Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Final Rules
Regarding Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less
than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers and Final Rules
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (June 22, 2011) [hereinafter
Statement to Adopt Final Rules Regarding Exemptions], available at http://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/2011/spch062211tap-items-1-2.htm (“[I]t is difficult to identify any appreciable marginal
investor protection benefit from the public disclosure that the final rule dictates. To the contrary,
there is reason to worry that at least some of the information might be competitively sensitive and
that mandating its public disclosure could harm [venture capital] funds and the very investors that
the rule purports to protect.”).
322. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,963.
323. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984) (making an efficiency argument for mandatory
disclosure); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (assessing arguments in favor of mandatory disclosure
regulation and arguing that benefits and costs of disclosure regulation should be compared with
costs and benefits of alternative forms of regulation); Manne, supra note 178, at 511 (arguing that
“[b]ehavioral responses to regulation, even via mere disclosure, can be costly. Firms and
managers will endeavor to circumvent costly regulations, regulations will have unintended
consequences, and dynamic market shifts may undermine much of the regulations’ force. That
these effects eradicate the benefits of mandatory disclosure is not itself inevitable; that they exist,
however, is.”); Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting
and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (Mar. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398 (reviewing disclosure
literature, discussing firm-specific and macro-economic costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure,
and discussing costs and benefits of financial reporting and disclosure regulations).
324. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,981. The SEC cites as
benefits its receipt of “information as to whether these advisers or their activities might present
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The SEC also anticipates that the new reporting requirements would have a
positive effect on investor confidence and consequently on capital
formation:
Access to the information we are requiring exempt reporting advisers to
report may also increase clients’ and prospective clients’ trust in
investment advisers, which may encourage them to seek professional
investment advice and encourage them to invest their financial assets. This
may enhance capital formation by making more assets available for
325
investment and enhancing the allocation of capital generally.

As part of the analysis, the SEC should have considered whether some
of the anticipated greater confidence might result from a misperception
about the SEC’s role in verifying the information. Such misplaced
confidence can lead to inadequate monitoring by investors and inefficient
capital allocation. As the reaction of Bernard Madoff investors illustrated,
investors often believe that the SEC is watching advisers more closely than
it is. 326
With respect to costs, the SEC estimated that the amortized paperwork
burden over three years for exempt reporting advisers would be 2.67 hours
but does not provide a clear basis for this assumption. 327 More significantly,
however, the SEC failed to seriously assess potential indirect costs of the
exempt reporting adviser requirements. One of these, which commenters
raised, was investor confusion resulting from exempt reporting advisers’
use of Form ADV, which has traditionally only been used by registered
advisers. 328 By imposing extensive reporting requirements and pledging to
conduct routine examinations of these advisers, the SEC “collaps[ed] the
distinction between what it means to be unregistered versus registered as an
investment adviser.” 329 The Commission faulted commenters for failing to
“identify any specific costs associated with these concerns” 330 and
concluded that the costs of developing a new system outweighed these
concerns sufficient to warrant our further attention in order to protect their clients, investors, and
other market participants” and assistance to “investors and prospective investors in conducting
due diligence and . . . protect[ing] against fraud.” Id. at 42,982. As noted above, the SEC did not
establish the underlying problems before imposing these requirements.
325. Id. at 43,009.
326. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Court Expresses Antipathy for S.E.C. in Handling of Madoff
Case, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 10, 2013, 1:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/10
/court-expresses-antipathy-for-s-e-c-in-handling-of-madoff-case/.
327. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 43,000. As one example, the
SEC bases its estimate for annual updates to Form ADV by taking an apparently arbitrary, eightyfive-percent haircut from the one-hour estimate for registered advisers. Id.
328. See, e.g., Letter from Seward & Kissel LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 10 (Jan.
31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-37-10/s73710-112.pdf (“We believe that
using the same form for both registered advisers and exempt reporting advisers will create
confusion among investors.”).
329. Statement to Adopt Final Rules Regarding Exemptions, supra note 321.
330. Rules Implementing Amendments Release, supra note 75, at 42,990.
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concerns. 331 The SEC also should have considered the opportunity cost of
the resources that exempt reporting advisers would spend in order to
comply with these requirements. 332
V. THE SEC’S POST-GUIDANCE PERFORMANCE
Court decisions striking down SEC regulations due to poor quality or
insufficient use of economic analysis motivated the Commission staff to
promulgate new guidance for analysis and restore the chief economist’s
direct reporting relationship to the chairman. 333 It may take time, however,
for economists to gain full control over the analysis and for the Commission
to develop experience in using the analysis to make decisions. Thus,
although approximately two years have passed since the SEC staff released
its guidance memorandum, it remains too early to determine definitively
whether the guidance is improving analysis.
Preliminary evidence is mixed. Although without specific consideration
of the elements in the staff guidance memorandum, a federal district court
deemed sufficient the SEC’s analysis in connection with the conflict
minerals rule—one of the major rules adopted subsequent to the
guidance. 334 As the judge noted, however, the humanitarian objectives of
the rule at issue distinguished it from other rules that had been invalidated
in the past. 335 In June 2013, in response to a congressional request, the
SEC’s inspector general issued a report that concluded the SEC’s analysis
largely followed the guidance, based on a review of twelve regulations
proposed or finalized after the guidance was issued. 336 However, the
inspector general’s report mostly assessed whether the SEC’s analysis
331. Id. at 42,962.
332. Dissenting Commissioner Casey explained this cost as follows:
Every dollar that is spent by a venture capital fund to satisfy the Commission’s newly
imposed regulatory requirements is a dollar that cannot be invested in the next Google,
Apple, or Amazon. These dollars will never reach nascent companies that are developing
green tech, cutting-edge biotechnology, or products that are even beyond our dreams today.

Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting—Rules Implementing
Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital
Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and
Foreign Private Advisers (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011
/spch062211klc-items1-2.htm.
333. See supra notes 55–70 and accompanying text.
334. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013).
335. Id. at 57 (noting that prior cases in which the SEC’s economic analysis had been found
deficient “involved shortcomings on the Commission’s part with respect to the economic
implications of its actions—economic implications of its actions . . . . By contrast, none of those
decisions lends support to Plaintiff’s theory that the Conflict Minerals Rule must be invalidated
because the SEC failed to consider whether the Rule would actually achieve the humanitarian
benefits identified by Congress.”) (footnote omitted).
336. SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., USE OF THE CURRENT GUIDANCE ON ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS IN SEC RULEMAKINGS (2013) [hereinafter, SEC OIG POST-GUIDANCE REPORT].
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covered specified topics; it did not extensively assess the quality of the
analysis. To see whether the quality of the SEC’s analysis may have
improved, we reviewed an important regulation in the inspector general’s
sample using the Report Card methodology. This preliminary review of one
regulation suggests that there may be much more room for improvement
than the inspector general’s report indicates. Once the SEC has finalized
more major rules, it will be possible to rigorously assess the SEC’s
progress.
A. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF SEC POST-GUIDANCE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
One of the major rules adopted after the SEC staff guidance took effect
implemented the Dodd-Frank mandate to promulgate regulations requiring
companies to make annual disclosures about the origin of conflict minerals
“necessary to the functionality or production of a product” they
manufacture.337 The genesis for the rule was concern for victims of violence
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 338
The rule was challenged in court on a number of grounds, one of which
was that the SEC’s economic analysis was allegedly flawed. 339 The
emphasis on economic analysis was not surprising given that one of the
plaintiffs had estimated that the rule would cost $9–16 billion, in contrast to
the SEC’s estimate of $71.2 million. 340 The plaintiffs also faulted the SEC
for failing to determine whether the rulemaking would have its intended
benefits. 341 The SEC explained that it was unable to do so given the atypical
nature of the rule’s objectives:
The statute therefore aims to achieve compelling social benefits, which we
are unable to readily quantify with any precision, both because we do not
have the data to quantify the benefits and because we are not able to assess
how effective Section 1502 will be in achieving those benefits.

337. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213.
338. See, e.g., Letter from Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senator, and Jim McDermott, U.S.

Congressman, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 1 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-22.pdf
(explaining that Congress intended the conflict minerals provision to address the violence in the
DRC that “has already claimed more than five million lives and continues to result in the death
and rape of countless new victims”).
339. Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief at 26–34, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43
(D.D.C.
2013)
(No.
13-cv-635),
available
at
http://www.nam.org/~/media/B5825277D7C144A48C2C4442054900D4/NAM_v_SEC_brief_onl
y_01162013.pdf.
340. Id. at *16.
341. Id. at *27–31.
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Additionally, the social benefits are quite different from the economic or
342
investor protection benefits that our rules ordinarily strive to achieve.

The court, taking a narrow view of the Exchange Act’s requirement to
“consider . . . whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation,” held that the SEC did not have to consider whether the
conflict minerals rule “would actually achieve the social benefits Congress
envisioned.” 343 The court placed great weight on the fact that the regulation
was the product of “Congress’s determination that the due diligence and
disclosure requirements it enacted would help to promote peace and
security in the DRC,” rather than the result of “the Commission having
independently perceived a problem within its purview and having exercised
its own judgment to craft a rule or regulation aimed at that problem.” 344 The
SEC, the court held, “rightly maintains that its role was not to ‘secondguess’ Congress’s judgment as to the benefits of the disclosure.” 345 The
court went on to suggest that, with respect to this particular rule, the SEC
may not have even been subject to the statutory requirement to consider
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.346 To the extent statutory
analysis requirements applied, the court held that the SEC had fulfilled
them, even though it had not considered whether the rule would achieve the
intended humanitarian benefits.347 The court also held that the SEC did not
act arbitrarily or capriciously in reaching its cost estimates.348
Regardless of whether it was a statutory violation, the SEC’s failure to
evaluate benefits in connection with this rulemaking runs directly counter to
the guidance in the staff’s memorandum. However, because the rule’s
humanitarian objective makes it atypical of SEC rules, the analysis
employed with respect to that rulemaking may not shed much light on the
SEC’s progress on economic analysis under the staff guidance.

342. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 67,716, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,273, 56,335 (Sept.
12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249(b)) [hereinafter Conflict Minerals Release];
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 67,717, 77
Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
343. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 56 (D.D.C. 2013) (footnote omitted)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f)).
344. Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 58 n.15 (arguing that because Congress had already made a public interest
determination, the SEC did not have to and that, absent an obligation to make a public interest
finding, the SEC does not have an obligation to consider efficiency, competition, and capital
formation).
347. Id. at 59.
348. Id. at 60–61.
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B. SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL’S POST-GUIDANCE ASSESSMENT OF
SEC ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The inspector general of the SEC conducted a post-guidance assessment
of SEC economic analysis, which included the conflicts mineral rule and
eleven other rules. 349 For eight of the twelve rules, the report found
evidence that the SEC’s economists and the rule-writing teams collaborated
in assessing the economic effects of the rule.350 However, some of the rules
did not fully specify the baseline. 351 Almost all of the rules discussed
benefits and costs qualitatively, but they offered little quantification of costs
beyond paperwork costs. 352 Only one rule attempted to quantify benefits. 353
Only five of the twelve rules fully explained the reasons benefits and costs
were not quantified. 354 Nevertheless, the inspector general concluded that
the SEC’s analysis “followed the spirit and intent” of the 2012 guidance. 355
The inspector general did make some recommendations for improvements
in the SEC’s analysis, including “further incorporating specific elements in
OMB Circular A-4 or practices that Federal administrative agencies have
adopted.” 356
C. REPORT CARD ANALYSIS OF A POST-GUIDANCE REGULATION
We suspect there may have been less improvement in the SEC’s
economic analysis than the inspector general’s broad conclusion suggests. It
is one thing to offer some discussion of the topics listed in the SEC’s
guidance, such as potential justifications for the regulation or possible
alternatives. It is quite another thing to offer a thorough, evidence-based
analysis of the problem the regulation is supposed to solve, or to assess the
benefits and costs of a wide range of different alternatives. To illustrate
these differences, we used the Report Card methodology to assess the
analysis accompanying the SEC’s Clearing Agency Standards rule,
finalized in November 2012. 357
The Clearing Agency Standards rule is one of the rules included in the
inspector general’s report. 358 If the SEC’s economic analysis improved by
the end of 2012, we would expect to see signs of that in this rule. The
Clearing Agency Standards Rule set forth risk management standards for
349. SEC OIG POST-GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 336, at 10 (explaining that the review
covered twelve rules, seven of which were reviewed “more in depth”).
350. Id. at 15.
351. Id. at 11.
352. Id. at 15.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 19.
355. Id. at i.
356. Id. at 34.
357. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72.
358. SEC OIG Post-Guidance Report, supra note 336, at app. VI (listing “Substantive Rules
Examined”).
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SEC-registered clearing agencies, which are part of the plumbing of the
securities markets. 359 Among other roles, clearing agencies serve as central
counterparties, assuming the responsibilities of the seller to the buyer and
vice versa. 360 Because of the fundamental role of clearing agencies in the
securities markets, the manner in which they are managed is particularly
important and has long been a core SEC responsibility. 361 Dodd-Frank only
underscored the importance of this responsibility by mandating that many
security-based swaps, which previously were cleared bilaterally, be cleared
through a registered clearing agency and giving the SEC additional
authority with respect to registered clearing agencies.362
The Clearing Agency Standards rule comes in response to the SEC’s
new Dodd-Frank authority. Registered clearing agencies are required to
establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures
governing their operations and risk management. 363 The rule sets forth
minimum standards for clearing agencies that act as central counterparties
(and thus are exposed to risk of financial loss if participants default on their
obligations) in a number of areas including risk management, standards for
membership, and recordkeeping and financial disclosure.364 The rule
includes minimum standards for credit exposure monitoring, margin
requirements, financial resources, margin model validation, membership
standards, recordkeeping, and financial disclosures. 365 The rule also
requires registered clearing agencies to maintain written policies and
procedures related to a number of other operational and risk management
areas. 366
359. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,220 (explaining that clearing
agencies “have become an essential part of the infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets” and
that “[t]he new rule establishes minimum requirements regarding how registered clearing agencies
must maintain effective risk management procedures and controls as well as meet the statutory
requirements under the Exchange Act on an ongoing basis”).
360. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Standards for Risk Management and Operations of
Clearing Agencies (Oct. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Risk Management and Operations Press Release],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171485518#
.UwWZ-84gv_Y (“Clearing agencies generally act as middlemen to the parties in a securities
transaction.”).
361. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra 72, at 66,200 (describing the SEC’s nearly four
decades of responsibility for facilitating securities clearance and settlement and noting that “[o]ver
the years clearing agencies registered with the Commission have become an essential part of the
infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets”).
362. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701–814, 124 Stat. 1641–1822.
363. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,228 (describing Rule 17Ad-22).
364. Risk Management and Operations Press Release, supra note 360 (“The rules would set
standards with respect to measurement and management of credit exposures, margin requirements,
financial resources and margin model validation. The rule also establishes certain recordkeeping
and financial disclosure requirements for all registered clearing agencies as well as several new
operational standards for these entities.”).
365. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,230, 66,243 (describing Rule
17Ad-22(b) and (c)).
366. Id. at 66,245 (describing Rule 17Ad-22(d)).
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We chose to assess this particular rule, even though it is not a major
rule, for several reasons. First, it was adopted long enough after the staff’s
memorandum on economic analysis took effect to reflect the
memorandum’s principles for economic analysis. Second, two of the major
rules adopted after the guidance went into effect were joint rules with the
CFTC. 367 The other three major rules adopted after the guidance took effect
and at the time we undertook this analysis all have unique features that
would have complicated the SEC’s analysis. 368 By contrast, the Clearing
Agency Standards rule is well within the agency’s area of expertise and is a
more routine SEC rulemaking. Finally, this rule is one of the more
substantial rules finalized from June 2012 through mid-2013, when we
selected a post-guidance rule for review. 369
The Report Card evaluation of the Clearing Agency Standards rule
reveals little improvement in the quality of analysis. Table 5 shows that this
rule achieved about the same total, openness, analysis, and use scores as the
seven pre-2012 SEC rules assessed above. Turning to the five factors in the
SEC guidance, the Clearing Agency Standards rule scored slightly better
than the average pre-2012 SEC rule for analysis of the baseline and
alternatives.

367. Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, Securities Act
Release No. 9338, Exchange Act Release No. 67,453, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 13, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 230, 240, 241); Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based
Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible
Contract Participant,” Exchange Act Release No. 66,868, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596 (May 23, 2012) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240).
368. The first major rule related to the planned consolidated audit trail, a project that involves
active participation by self-regulatory organizations such as the stock exchanges. The SEC
directed these entities to develop a proposal and defers the related economic analysis. See
Consolidated Audit Trail Release, supra note 207, at 45,726 (“A robust economic analysis of the
next step—the actual creation and implementation of a consolidated audit trail itself—requires
information on the plan’s detailed features (and their associated cost estimates) that will not be
known until the SROs submit their [National Market System] plan to the Commission for its
consideration. Accordingly, the Commission is deferring this analysis until such time as it may
approve any NMS plan—that is, after the NMS plan, together with its detailed information and
analysis, has been submitted by the SROs and there has been an opportunity for public
comment.”). The other two major rules, one of which was discussed above, were Dodd-Frank
rulemakings related to conflict minerals and companies engaged in resource extraction. Both of
these rules are atypical of SEC rulemakings in terms of subject matter and degree of interest from
affected entities and interest groups. See Conflict Minerals Release, supra note 342.
369. See, e.g., Purchase of Certain Debt Securities by Business and Industrial Development
Companies Relying on Investment Company Act Exemption, Investment Company Act Release
No. 30,268, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,117 (Nov. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (replacing
credit ratings with alternative standards of creditworthiness for entities relying on a single SEC
exemption).
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TABLE 5. REPORT CARD EVALUATION OF THE CLEARING AGENCY
STANDARDS RULE COMPARED TO SEVEN PRE-2012 SEC RULES
Average for Seven Pre-2012
SEC Regulations
Total
Openness
Analysis
Use
Systemic Problem
Baseline
Alternatives
Outcomes
Cost-Benefit

15.7
9.4
3.9
2.4
0.7
0.6
1.3
0.9
1

Clearing Agency
Standards Rule

17
9
5
3
1
2
2
1
1

The Clearing Agency Standards rule scored better than average for
analysis of the baseline because, unlike most of the other rules, it actually
mentioned some baseline conditions relevant to one important aspect of the
rule. In its discussion of clearing agencies’ risk management practices, the
analysis provides a detailed description of current practices, which the SEC
contends are largely consistent with the international standards on which
the proposed regulation is based.370 This may be a case in which the
regulatory analysis (identification of baseline practices and international
standards) may have influenced the form of the rule.
However, the SEC’s treatment of current industry practices (which it
appears to regard as the baseline behavior that would continue in the
absence of the new regulation) should only be the first step toward a
projection of the practices the SEC expects to occur in the absence of new
regulation and outcomes the SEC expects those practices to produce. The
SEC’s own economic analysis guidance notes:
An economic analysis of a proposed regulatory action compares
the current state of the world, including the problem the rule is
designed to address, to the expected state of the world with the
proposed regulation (or regulatory alternatives) in effect.
Economic impacts of proposed regulations are measured as the
371
differences between these two scenarios.

The Clearing Agency Standards notice offers little insight into how current
practices might change in the absence of the new regulation or the baseline
level of risk associated with current practices. Thus, although the analysis
offers somewhat more discussion of baseline conditions than the other
regulations, the baseline analysis is far from complete.

370. Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,266–71.
371. SEC Guidance, supra note 55, at 6–7.
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This rule scored higher than average for analysis of alternatives solely
due to its discussion of the baseline. In the Regulatory Report Card,
analysis of the baseline is one component of the analysis of alternatives
because the baseline should describe the outcomes expected under the “no
new regulatory action” alternative. 372
The Clearing Agency Standards rule also received a noticeably higher
score than most of the other SEC regulations that we reviewed on Report
Card Criterion 9, which assesses the extent to which the regulatory agency
claimed to use the analysis in its decisions. The rule received 3 points on
this criterion; only one of the seven pre-2012 SEC rules scored as highly.
This rule fared better than most others on use of analysis because it
discussed, in a few paragraphs, the pros and cons of higher or lower net
capital requirements for membership in a clearing agency. 373 The
Commission clearly tried to balance market power concerns against risk
management, opting to set minimum net capital requirements at a level it
hoped would encourage new entrants to become clearing agency members.
Although the economic logic is clear, it is not clear how any economic
calculation led the SEC to conclude that the specific figure chosen ($50
million) is optimal. This is about the only instance in which the economic
analysis appears to be used to make decisions about this rule.
These very modest improvements in the baseline discussion and use of
analysis may be harbingers of better things to come, or they may be random
variations. Given that major federal rules and their accompanying analysis
often take several years to develop, we believe any conclusions about the
effects of the SEC’s 2012 economic analysis guidance would be premature
at this early date.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In March 2012, the SEC pledged to improve its economic analysis in
line with the principles enunciated in the executive orders that govern
regulatory analysis by executive branch agencies. This is a positive and
significant step for three reasons. First, the SEC opted to adopt the triedand-true analytical criteria that have guided diverse executive branch
agencies for decades rather than trying to invent a new set of criteria from
scratch. This means there are substantial opportunities to learn from “best
practices” employed by executive branch agencies, including executive
branch agencies that regulate financial markets. Second, the SEC’s
guidance emphasizes the most fundamental aspects of regulatory impact
analysis: assessment of the need for the regulation, identification of a
baseline against which to measure the effects of the regulation,
identification of reasonable alternatives, and an evaluation of the costs and
372. Ellig & McLaughlin, supra note 82, at 870.
373. See Clearing Agency Standards Release, supra note 72, at 66,278.
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benefits of the proposed regulation and the alternatives. Third, the SEC also
pledged to involve its economists throughout the rule-development process
rather than expecting them to produce an analysis after the major decisions
on the rule have already been made.
Evidence from pre-2012 rulemakings suggests that these were wise
decisions. This Article has identified significant weaknesses in the SEC’s
pre-2012 economic analysis. The SEC’s analyses read more like
justifications of the final rule than careful analyses of the underlying
problems and the various ways that those problems could be addressed. The
economic analyses explored here failed, beyond sporadic references, to take
advantage of the academic literature that would help them to analyze the
rulemakings. Oftentimes the analyses deferred to the statute rather than
asking fundamental questions about the need for and objectives of the
rulemaking at issue. In designing many of these rules, the SEC did not
appear to have a clear picture of what it was trying to achieve. The absence
of a clear objective may be largely to blame for the haphazard nature of the
economic analyses in these rules. The SEC often based cost-benefit
estimates on speculation and failed altogether to seriously contend with
potential indirect costs of the regulation.
Our evaluation using the Mercatus Regulatory Report Card
methodology found that the quality and use of regulatory analysis at the
SEC prior to 2012 was significantly inferior to the quality and use of
regulatory analysis by executive branch agencies. This occurred in spite of
the fact that executive branch agencies themselves usually fall far short of
the standards articulated in the executive orders. Most tellingly, executive
branch agencies outscored the SEC on the Report Card criteria most
directly relevant to the topics in the Commission’s new economic analysis
guidance. These results suggest that the new guidance addresses significant
problems in SEC economic analysis, and improvement should be a major
priority.
Were the SEC to conduct more thorough analysis, investors, regulated
entities, Congress, and the Commission itself would benefit. Investors, who
ultimately bear the costs of many regulations, would benefit from
regulations that are more likely to be effective in solving real problems and
more appropriately designed to satisfy a particular objective. Better analysis
would also help to ensure that regulated entities target their compliance
resources in the areas in which they would be most helpful at achieving the
SEC’s objectives. More thoughtful, comprehensive analysis will also help
the SEC to demonstrate to Congress the costs and benefits of the choices
that Congress has made and thus provide Congress with the necessary
information to make decisions about potential changes to legislative
mandates. The SEC routinely contends that it does not have adequate
resources to carry out its responsibilities. Better analysis will help it make
better choices about how to spend the resources it has.
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Our analysis provides a baseline against which the SEC’s rulemakings
finalized after the SEC’s most recent staff guidance on economic analysis
took effect. Once more regulations have been finalized pursuant to the
memorandum’s guidance, examining whether and how the SEC’s analysis
has improved will be a fruitful area for future research.
Another fruitful area for research would be to examine how other
independent regulatory agencies’ economic analyses compare with those of
the SEC. As this Article demonstrates, an agency that is not committed to
careful, well-supported, transparent economic analysis tends to base its
rules on speculation and aspiration rather than a concrete understanding of
the circumstances in which its rule will have to function. A more
comprehensive economic analysis may be more costly to the agency in the
short run, but in the long run it may significantly increase the benefits or
reduce the costs of the regulations the Commission adopts. We anticipate
that, as the SEC’s much-needed decision to retool its regulatory analysis
takes hold, the agency, markets, and investors will reap the rewards.

